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Abstract 
This research paper examines the defence of superior orders defined in article 33 of the 
Rome Statute. It begins with an overview of the history and the development of the defence. 
Then, the paper explores in depth the conditions of the defence and the definition of manifest 
illegality considering legal-philosophic theories and judgments on the issue. It continues with 
describing and commenting on the current legal debates about the defence. The paper asks 
whether there still is a need for the defence exploring the other defences of the Rome Statute 
and shows, why article 33 is a valuable part of the treaty. Lastly, it points out that the 
defence of superior orders is an excuse and not a justification. 
Excluding abstract, table of content, footnotes and bibliography this paper contains 
13 ,666 words. 
Table of Contents 
INTRODUCTION ... .. ...... ........ .. ........ .... .. ........ ... .... ..... ... .. .... .... ... ...... .... ...... .. ... .. .. ... ........ I 
II HISTORY - FROM BREISACH TO ROM E ....... ... ...... .... .. ..... .. .... .. .. ... ..... .... .... ... ........ . 3 
III ARTICLE 33 OF THE ROME STATUTE ........... ...................... ...... .... ...... ...... ... .......... . 7 
A Presumption of Criminal Liability .. .......... ............................................................... .. .. 7 
Superior Orders vs Command Responsibility ... ..... ......................... .... .... ..... .... ... ... 8 
2 The Order ... ..... .... .. ... ... .... ..... .............. .... ....... .. ..... ... ........................ ..... ........ ... .... .. . 9 
3 Availability of the Defence to Civilians .. .. ............... ....... .... .... .. ..... .. .... ............... I 0 
B Exemption ... ... .. .... .. ... .... .... ........ ............................. .................... .. ....... ... ...... .. ............ 12 
C Manifest Illegality of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity .. ......... .. .................. 14 
IV MANIFEST ILLEGALITY .... ........ ....... .. ............. .......... .... .. ... .. ... ........ .. ....... .... ............ 15 
A Natural Law ..... ...... .... .... ........... .... ......... ... ..... ... ...... .... ... .... ...... ........................ .. .. ..... . 16 
B Legal Positivisn1 .. ...... .... ..... .... ......... ......... .......... ..... ........ ... ...... .. ... .... .. ........ .. ............ 17 
C Radbruch ... .... ... ...... .. .... ......... ...... .. ........ ... ....... .... .. .... ...... .......... .... ........... ... ... .. .......... I 7 
Radbruch 's Formula .... ........ ......... .. .. .................................. .................................. 18 
2 Berlin Wall Shootings .. ......... ................ ....... ...... .... .. .. ...... ...... ....... ....... ... ......... ... . 18 
D Interim Conclusion ... ... ..... ..... ... .. ....... ............. ................... ........................................ 2 1 
V CURRENT LEGAL DEBATES ......................... ... ....... ........... ... ................................... 24 
A Breach of Customary International Law ........... .. ............................. ............. ............. 24 
B War Crimes .... .. ...... ... ..... ....... .. .............. .......... .. ... ..... .. .... ..................................... ...... 26 
C Aggression .. .... .... ... .. ..... ................. ... ............................................... ....................... ... 30 
D Moral Dilen1n1a .... .. .. ... .... ... ....... .. ......... .... .. ... ....... ............................. ........ ................ . 33 
VI NO NEED FOR THE DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS ? .. .. ... .... .... ........ ..... ... ... .. 36 
A Article 3 l(l)(d) -The Defence of Duress ............ ................. ....... ... ....... ..... ............... 37 
B Article 32-The Defence of Mistake .......... .... ... ... ............. .... ................. ....... .. .......... 39 
Mistake of Fact and Superior Orders ........... .. ..... .. .............. .... .. .... ..... ..... .......... : .. 40 
2 Mistake of Law and Superior Orders .................. ....... ... ....... .. ... .. .. ..... ..... ............. 42 
C Interim Conclusion .. .... .. ........ ........ .. ........ ............................................... ................ .. . 44 
VII JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUS E ... ... .. .... ............ ... ........... ............................................. 45 
Vlll CONCLUSION ......... .... ... .. ... ........ ...... ....... .......... ... ............. ... ... .. ... .. ........ ... .................. 46 
Bibliography ........... .... .. .. ... ... ... ... ... ...... ............ ...... ....... ........ ............................. ...... ..... ............ i 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY OF 
wi:=1 L INGTOl\l I IBRARY 
I INTRODUCTION 
"And they came to the place which God had told him of; and Abraham built the 
altar there, and laid the wood in order, and bound Isaac his son, and laid him on 
the altar, upon the wood." - Genesis 22 - 9 
The obedience of superior orders without questioning them is an idea promoted 
by many sources. Abraham's willingness to sacrifice his own son made him a 
good servant of God. Obedience of law makes you a good citizen. As a child we 
learn that obeying parents and teachers saves us a lot of trouble. There are 
people who know better and we learn to trust superiors. Nevertheless there are 
some clear examples of disobedience. Although he had committed terrorist acts, 
had incited people to violent resistance against the government and planned a 
guerrilla war, Nelson Mandela was a recipient of the Nobel Peace Prize. He 
received the award together with Frederik Willem de Klerk "for their work for 
the peaceful termination of the apartheid regime, and for laying the foundations 
for a new democratic South Africa." 1 Mahatma Ghandi instigated thousands of 
Indians to ignore the Registration Act and created the non-cooperation 
movement, yet he is a hero, best known for his non-violence policy and his 
work for the liberation of India. Who would not side with the outlaw Robin 
Hood against the Sheriff of Nottingham, who did nothing except his law-abiding 
job of collecting taxes? Obviously, resisting orders or the law can be good and 
moreover, necessary. Why is that? 
An answer was given by Gustav Radbruch, a most notable philosopher of 
jurisprudence in the 20th century: "Extreme injustice is no law"2 
1 The Nobelprize "The Nobel Peace Prize 1993" www.nobelprize.org (accessed 24 February 
2010). 
2 David Dyzenhaus "The Dilemma of Legality" in The limits of lmv Autin Sara!, Laurence 
Douglas, Martha Meri II Umpfrey ( ed) (Stanford University Press, Standford, 2005) 142. 
This provides a reason but little guidance therefore, it is even more important to 
ask : When is that the case? How do we know? 
This research paper tries to answer these questions. It has a close look at 
article 33 of the Rome Statute. It begins with an overview of the history of the 
defence of superior orders . lt then deals with the conditions under which the 
defence can be raised and the current definition of manifest illegality. For that 
purpose the essay gives a brief overview of the main philosophical theories 
relevant and the most important judgments. Further, the paper discusses the 
current points of criticism. Can civilians raise the defence? Is the defence a 
violation of customary international law? Why are war crimes not included? 
Lastly, the paper asks whether the defence is needed anymore at all. 
To anticipate that last answer: Yes, the defence of superior orders is needed. 
Very much. The Rome Statute has done a good job with article 33 and this 
paper will show why. 
2 
II HISTORY - FROM BREISACH TO ROME 
The defence of superior orders is as old as war and criminal law itself, domestic 
and international. For just as long it has also been a matter of controversy for 
scholars and judges. 
The first person to be tried by an ad hoe tribunal for war crimes3 such as murder, 
arson and rape and to raise the defence of superior orders was the German 
Governor of Breisach Peter von Hagenbach in 14 74.4
 Hagenbach had followed 
the order from Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy to force the citizens of 
Breisach so they would submit. He defended himself: " Is it not known that 
soldiers owe absolute obedience to their superiors?"5 The Judges, however, 
found his behaviour to be contrary to the laws of God and of man. Hagenbach, 
as a knight, had had the duty to prevent such crimes. He was found guilty, 
deprived of his rank and decapitated. So even in the Middle Ages, when 
obedience to superior orders was of great importance and civilian lives were not 
worth very much, the Court acknowledged that an order contrary to the very 
core of justice could not be followed. 6 The same attitude can be found in the 
cases Cook7 and Axtel/8 in the year 1660, and later in a non-military context in 
R v Jame/ ( 183 7) and R v Trainer1° ( 1864 ). In R v James the Court stated: 
3 This classification as war crimes is disputable. The war had not formally started yet; however, 
Breisach had been occupied territory . See Edoardo Greppi "The evolution of individual criminal 
responsibility under international law" www.icrc.ch (accessed 20 November 2009) 
4 See with further references : Greppi , above n 1; Hitomi Takemura International Human Right 
to Conscientious Objection lo Military Service and Individual Duties lo Disobey Manifestly 
Illegal Orders (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2009) 139; Matthew R Lippman " Humanitarian 
Law: The Development and Scope of the Superior Orders Defense" (2001 - 2002) 20 Penn St 
Int ' I L Rev 153, 158. 
5 Quoted in: Greppi , above n 1; Leslie C Green "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man" 
(1970) 8 Can YB Int'I L 61 [cited as Green 1970), 77. 
6 Howard S Levie "The Rise and Fall ofan Internationally Codified Denial of the Defense of 
Superior Orders" (1998) 70 lnt'I L Stud Ser US Naval War Col 169, 270. 
1 Cook 's Case ( 1660) St Tr 1077, 1113 ; see further : Green 1970, above n 5, 69, 70. 
8 Axtell 's Case (1660) 84 ER 1060; see further : Green 1970, above n 5; Mitchell Franklin 
"Sources Of International Law Relating To Sanctions Against War Criminals" ( 1945 - 1946) 36 
J Crim L & Criminology 153 , 161. 
9 R v James 173 ER 429, 430; see further : Green 1970, above n 5, 71 . 
10 R v Trainer 176 ER 488, 491 ; see further : Green 1970, above n 5, 71. 
3 
If these men acted bona tide in obedience to the orders ofa superior, conceiving that 
he had the right which he claimed, they are not within the Act of Parliament. But if 
either of these men knew that it was a malicious act on the part of his master, I think 
then that he would be guilty of the offence charged. 
Although the defence of superior orders had generally a lot of support in 
England at that time, it had the clear limitation of manifest illegality.
11 
This was 
later called the ought to know policy. 12 However, there was no binding law on 
the issue, so the judgments differed from each other. In 1866, Willis J took 
various views of whether superior orders can work as a defence. In Keighley v 
Belf 3 he recognised an order as an absolute justification unless it was 
manifestly illegal , whereas in Dawkes v Lord Rokeb/4 he rejected the defence 
entirely supporting the absolute liability doctrine. 
After World War I the defence of superior orders became even more 
controversial. In preparation of the Treaty of Versai lies the Commission on the 
Responsibility of Authors of the War and on Enforcement of War was 
convened, but was unable to reach a consensus on the issue. 15 Therefore, they 
decided not to include the defence in the Treaty of Versailles and leave the 
courts to decide how to deal with the problem in each individual case. 16 As a 
result of this , in some of the post World War I cases in Germany the defence of 
superior orders was fully accepted, while in others declined. 17 The Llandovery 
Castle case is historically interesting, because the judgment provided a very 
11 Franklin, above n 8. 
12 Hilaire McCoubrey "From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring the Defence of Superior Orders" 
(2000) 50 Int ' l & Comp LQ 386, 392. 
13 Keighley v Bell I 76 Eng Rep 781 (1866)-cited in Leslie C Green "Fifteenth Waldemar A 
Solf Lecture in International Law- Superior Orders and Command Responsibility" (2003) 175 
Mi! L Rev 309 [ cited as Green 2003] , 3 16. 
14 Dawkes v Lord Rokeby 176 Eng Rep 800 (1866)- cited in Green 2003, 317. 
15 Lippman, above n 4, 164; Takemura, above n 4, 140. 
16 Ibid. 
17 See with further references : Takemura, above n 4, 140, 141 - defence accepted in the Robert 
Neumann case and the Dover Castle case. 
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similar approach to article 33 of the Rome Statute. 18 In this case a German 
submarine had torpedoed the British hospital ship Llandovery Castle. The 
submarine commander ordered his subordinates to open fire on the escaped 
survivors in the lifeboats. The Lieutenants carried out the order and were later 
charged with manslaughter. They raised the defence of superior orders but the 
Judge did not excused them. 19 
It is certainly to be urged, in favour of the military subordinates , that they are 
under no obligation to question the order of their superior officer and they can 
count upon its legality. But no such confidence can be held to exist if such an 
order is universally known to everybody including the accused , to be without any 
doubt whatever against the law. 
The international law scholar Lassa Oppenheim recognised it as an absolute 
defence.20 Until 1944 the British Manual of Military Law and the American 
Rules of Land Warfare followed the same view. 21 The British Manual read:
22 
[M]embers of the armed forces who commit such violations of the recognized rules 
of warfare as are ordered by their Government, or by their commander, are not war 
criminals and cannot therefore be punished by the enemy. He may punish the 
officials or commanders responsible for such orders if they fall into his hands, but 
otherwise he may only resort to other means of obtaining redress ... 
During World War II the general opinion shifted and the defence of superior 
orders was soon almost totally rejected.23 The British Manual and the American 
18 Judgment in the Case ofLieute11ants Dithmar and Boldt: Hospital Ship 'Lla11dovery Castle' 
(1922) l6AJIL708 
19 Ibid, 722. 
20 Lassa Oppenheim International Law, A Treatise Vol /1 (Longmans , Green, London, 1906) 264 
§ 253 - Position changed with the 6th edition by the editor Professor Lauterpacht. 
21 Chapter XIV, para 443 - quoted in: The United Nations War Crimes Commission Lmv reports 
of trials of war criminals (William S Hein & Co, Buffalo, New York, 1997) 18; Takemura, 
above 11 4, 141. 
22 Ibid, 18. 
23 McCoubrey, above 11 12,389. 
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Rules were redrafted24 and in the Nuremberg Trials the plea, raised in almost 
every case, was declined every time.25 The Tribunal hardly permitted it to be 
considered in terms of mitigation of punishment.26 Article 8 of the Charter of 
the Nuremberg Tribunal provided that "[t]he fact that the Defendant acted 
pursuant to order of his Government or of a superior shall not free him from 
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment, if the 
Tribunal determines that Justice so desires."27 According to the Tribunal it came 
down to the question of whether the perpetrator had had a "moral choice"
28
, 
which was usually assumed. In my opinion, the Tribunal did not separate the 
defence of superior orders distinctly enough from the defence of compulsion. 
This principle of absolute liability29 was upheld by the Tokyo Tribuna1
30
, the 
International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia
31 
and Rwanda
32 
(ICTY and ICTR) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone
33
. 
The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute) is the first 
international treaty to deal with the defence in a general manner. Concerning the 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment there had been consensus before to exclude superior orders as a 
24 Ibid , 391 ; Takemura, above n 4, 14 l. 
25 See with further references: Green 1970, above n 5, 86; Lippman, above n 4, 181. 
26 See with further references: Green 1970, above n 5, 86 . 
27 Charter of the International Military Tribunal ( 19 January 1946), full text available at 
http ://avalon.law.yale.edu/ imt/imtconst.asp 
28 
( 1946) 22 !MT 466. 
29 Paola Gaeta "The Defence of Superior Order: The Statute of the International Criminal Court 
versus Customary International Law" (1999) 10 EIJL 172, 178. 
3° Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, above n 27, Article 6. 
31 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious 
Violations oflnternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former 
Yugoslavia since 1991 (25 May 1993) UN Doc S/25704 [lCTY Statute], Article 7, para 4. 
32 International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Genocide and 
Other Serious Violations oflnternational Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of 
Rwanda and Rwandan Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between I January and 31 December 1994 (8 
~ovember 1994) Annex to~ Doc S'.RES/955 [ICTR Statute], Article 6, para 4. 
Agreement between the U111ted Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the 
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (4 October 2000) Annex to UN Doc 
S/2000/915 , Article 6, para 4. 
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defence. 34 Apart from that specific matter, states had been unable to agree upon 
a rule concerning superior orders previously in the Geneva Conventions or the 
Protocols. 35 
III ARTICLE 33 OF THE ROME STATUTE 
Article 33 of the Rome Statute reads: 
Superior orders and prescription of law 
I. The fact that a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court has been committed 
by a person pursuant to an order of a Government or of a superior, whether 
military or civilian, shall not relieve that person of criminal responsibility unless: 
(a) The person was under a legal obligation to obey orders of the Government or 
the superior in question ; 
(b) The person did not know that the order was unlawful ; and 
(c) The order was not manifestly unlawful. 
2. For the purposes of this article, orders to commit genocide or crimes against 
humanity are manifestly unlawful. 
A Presumption of Criminal Liability 
The first sentence of the article establishes the presumption of criminal 
liability. 36 As a general rule, subordinates cannot defend themselves by pointing 
at their commander. The presumption of criminal liability has the effect that the 
prosecution does not have the onus of proving the absence of the exception, but 
that the defence has to prove the existence of the requirements. 37 
34 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel , Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment, GA res . 39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 
( 1984), art 2(3) . 
35 Gaeta, above n 29, 190; Takemura, above n 4, 147. 
36 McCoubrey, above n 12, 392; Gaeta, above n 29, 190. 
37 Otto Triffterer Commenta,y on the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Beck, Miincher1, 2008) at article 33 para 14; Gaeta, above n 
21, 190. 
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J Superior Orders vs Command Responsibility 
The presumption of criminal liability of the subordinate seems to be 
contradictory to the principle of command responsibility. This maxim places 
responsibility for the misdemeanour of subordinates on their commanders.
38 
Article 28 of the Rome Statute states that 
" [a] military commander or person effectively acting as a military commander 
shall be criminally responsible for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court 
committed by forces under his or her effective command and control, or 
effective authority and control as the case may be, as a result of his or her failure 
to exercise control properly over such forces [ ... ]" 
This concept assumes the superior to be supposedly more advanced, more 
farsighted and - especially relevant in a military environment - to have more 
information and that they, therefore, have to supervise and exercise control over 
their subordinates.39 Maybe, most important is that they must be prevented of 
misusing their power. They cannot condone or, even worse, order criminal acts 
and afterwards excuse themselves by claiming that they were not the ones 
committing them. They cannot even say that they did not know what their 
subordinates were doing because they are by law supposed to know.
40 
As 
superiors, they are expected to enforce lawful behaviour and act in an exemplary 
manner.41 This seems to imply that subordinates might not be able to reflect on 
their actions sufficiently and, therefore, cannot be held responsible for them. 
Military commanders are expected to keep themselves informed about what is 
38 Arne Willy Dahl "Command Responsibility and the Defence of Superior Orders" www.uio.no 
(accessed 29 ovember 2009). 
39 James B Insco "Defense Of Superior Orders Before Military Commissions" (2003) 13 Duke J 
Comp & Int ' l L 389, 391 , Elies van Sliedregt The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals/or 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, Netherlands, 
2003), 339. 
40 Article 28(a)(i) of the Rome Statute reads: "[ ... ] owing to the circumstances at the time, should 
have known[ .. .]" 
41 Jan-Geert Alexander Knoops Defenses in Contemporary International Criminal Law (2nd ed, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden , 2008) 34. 
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going on, which is not a duty of a lower ranked soldier.42 They are expected to 
follow the lead of their superior because they have more information. In 
summary, if we suggest that military commanders are better informed, trained to 
lead and responsible for the behaviour of their subordinates, can we still hold 
those responsible for their actions, who were without information, trained to 
follow and misled by their superiors? Further, if so, does this responsibility not 
cause the danger to act as a "cloak behind which the responsibility of the state 
and its leaders or superiors can hide"43? 
International criminal law answers the first question m the affirmative and 
negates the second. Commanders and states have to take accountability for their 
subordinate's actions as well as individuals for their own. The concepts are not 
exclusive. On the contrary, they are reciprocal. Neither approach can relieve the 
other party from prosecution.44 No side can excuse itself by shifting guilt to the 
other, because both have an obligation to think. There can be more than one 
person liable for a crime. International criminal law is governed by the notion of 
concrete and individual guilt.45 Each wrongdoing has consequences for the 
perpetrator. This is a fair and important aspect of international criminal law and 
does not contradict the concept of command responsibility. 
2 The Order 
Paragraph I of article 33 of the Rome Statute already sets out two mam 
conditions for the defence. Firstly, there must have been an order by the 
Government or a superior and secondly, the crime must have been committed 
pursuant to this order. An order is any oral , written or otherwise expressed 
demand .46 The Oxford University Press dictionary defines an order as "(4) 
42 Dahl, above n 38. 
43 K11oops, above 11 41 , 34. 
44 Ibid, 34 . 
45 Ibid, 35 . 
46 Dahl , above 11 38 ; Triffterer, above n 37, at article 33 para 17; Sliedregt, above n 39, 323 . 
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Instructions: something that sb is told to do by sb in authority".
47 
This is in 
accordance with the use of the Rome Statute of the term. The order must be 
issued by the Government or a superior, but it must not necessarily be binding. 
Not every order creates a legal obligation to do, or omit to do a certain act.
48 
The first sentence does not deal with the question of whether the order was 
binding or not, because it does not matter for the assumption of liability. The 
general idea is that the subordinate is always responsible for their own actions 
regardless of whether they are based on an enforceable order, a void order or 
their own ideas. The question whether the order has to have the force of law is 
relevant later, when analysing the preconditions for the exemption. Otherwise, 
the first requirement would be redundant. To raise the defence of superior 
orders, paragraph I further makes clear that the order must be causal for the 
crime.49 This means that the subordinates must act on the order, not on their 
own discretion . The superior must set the cause for the action. Again, causing 
does not equal forcing. 
3 Availability of the Defence to Civilians 
Article 33 of the Rome Statute does not expressly include or exclude the 
availability of the defence for civilians. It accepts the binding effect of orders 
given by a civilian authority. Concerning the subordinate the Rome Statute only 
talks about the "person". Elies van Sliedregt states that "[i]n reality, the defence 
of superior orders is reserved for the military."50 She argues that the superior-
subordinate relationship should be interpreted in a narrow way to prevent an 
extensive use of the defence.51 Her argument, however, relates to the question of 
what civilian authorities are, not whether civilians shall be protected by the 
defence. Nevertheless, she concludes that civilian subordinates are excluded and 
47 Oxford University Press www.oup .com "order" (accessed 29 December 2009). 
48 Nico Keijzer Militmy Obedience (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den Rijn, Netherlands, 
1978) 22. 
49 Dahl , above n 38. 
50 Sliedregt, above n 39, 324. 
51 Ibid, 324. 
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that they have to claim article 31 (1 )( d) of the Rome Statue. 52 I tend to disagree 
with this conclusion as the defence of duress has quite different conditions from 
the defence of superior orders. Nothing about that issue can be found in the 
ICTY or ICTR Statutes.53 Article 28(b) of the Rome Statute expressly includes 
non-military superior-subordinate relationships and highlights the "effective 
control"54 as the important element. Transferring this classification to article 33 
any superior-subordinate relationship which enables the superior to give legally 
binding orders to the subordinate is included in article 33. This is a logical and 
legally consequent conclusion.55 Geert-Jan Alexander Knoops proposes a 
change of the wording of article 33( I )(a) to "the person was, considering the 
factual situation or circumstances, under an obligation to obey orders."56 
Considering the fact, that, for example, rebel groups operate in military-like 
ways, or that military regimes use civilians to work for them, this seems a 
sensible suggestion. In a case, in which a soldier is able to effectually plead the 
defence there is no reason why a civilian, in the exact same situation under the 
same putative obligation to act, should be denied that defence. Article 14( I) of 
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) reads: "All 
persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals." 57 As an international 
treaty the ICCPR is a valid source for an indication of how to interpret the 
wording of the Rome Statute.58 As a consequence, the equality of members of 
the armed forces and civilians should be assumed if the Rome Statute expressly 
does not rules otherwise, which it does not. Another indication is the emphasis 
the Manual for the Ratification and Implementation of the Rome Statute puts on 
the de facto control the authority exercises. 59 I do not think that the explicit 
52 Ibid, 339. 
53 Knoops, above n 41 , 40. 
54 Rome Statute art 28(b ). 
55 Knoops, above n 41 , 41. 
56 Ibid, 42. 
57 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (23 March I 976) UN Doc A/63 16 ( l 966) 
58 Rome Statute, art 25( l )(b) 
59 International Centre for Criminal Law Refo rm and Criminal Justice Poli cy International 
Criminal Court - Manual for the Ratification and lmplemenlatlon of the Rome Statute (J rded, 
University of British Columbia, Vancouver, 2008) 88 . 
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extension of the defence of superior orders to civilians would broaden the scope 
of the application of the defence in an unreasonable way. It will underline the 
intention of article 33 to protect those who trust their superiors. 
B Exemption 
Article 33 states three conditions for an exception to the rule, which need to be 
given cumulatively. On presentation of these requirements, the subordinate 
acted in good faith. 60 In this case the defence of superior orders applies. Firstly, 
the order must be issued by a formal authority of military or civilian nature. This 
is an objective requirement of the binding effect of the command.61 Here it is 
pointed out that the subordinate must have acted on an enforceable order within 
the scope of the authority of the superior. Otherwise the order would not be 
legally binding.62 Secondly, the subordinate does not recognise the unlawfulness 
of the order. This is a subjective condition that focuses on the insight of the 
individual. The subordinate must believe that the demanded behaviour is legal 
and within their duties. 
An issue, one might consider in this context, are orders given in the heat of a 
battle where action is required immediately. Some courts argue for a conviction 
of a subordinate who raises the defence of superior orders that the order was not 
given on the battlefield and that, therefore, the person had time to realise the 
unlawfulness.63 In US v Calley the Court of Military Appeals stated that " [i]n 
the stress of combat, a member of the armed forces cannot reasonably be 
expected to make a refined legal judgment [ ... ]"64 The argumento e contrario 
leads to the conclusion that the courts would recognise those orders given in the 
action of a battle as a valid defence. It has to be kept in mind that the "battlefield 
60 Sliedregt, above n 39, 324. 
6 1 Dahl, above n 38 . 
62 Keijzer, above n 48 , 23. 
63 US v Calley ( 1973) 22 USCMA 534,543 , 544; see for further references: Antonio Cassese 
International Criminal law (Oxford University Press, Oxford , 2003) 239. 
64 US v Calley, above n 63, 543, 544 - This aspect did not apply to Calley. 
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reality is one of extreme chaos" .65 Military law, international humanitarian law, 
domestic law - there are many sources of law and even more ways of 
interpreting them. This can be a complex issue.66 A commonly quoted comment 
by a US Army officer is: " I know that if I ever go to war again, the first person 
I'm taking is my lawyer."67 It is a logical consequence to assume that the 
perpetrator must have had time to reflect on the situation to be criminally liable 
for any behaviour. However, a manifestly unlawful act is not something that can 
only be detected by legal experts. It is something extremely obvious. 
Accordingly, a battlefield aspect cannot be confirmed when looking at the 
judgments on the issue. The defence of superior orders has never been fully 
accepted in international criminal law regardless of the circumstances of the 
case.68 What follows from the argumentation is not that criminal liability is 
grounded on a well-considered decision to obey the order. The fact that a 
subordinate had time to reflect on a command to commit a crime emphasises 
their liability, but it only means, that they are all the more culpable. The 
accountability follows purely from the crime itself. This is necessary and fair, 
because international criminal law deals with the most serious crimes, with the 
worst atrocities. The circumstances in which the order had been given can only 
be considered in terms of the measurement of guilt and punishment.69 So did 
Judge Quinn in US v Calley continue that criminal responsibility, even in this 
battlefield-scenario, can only be waived " if [a member of the armed forces] 
guesses wrong on a question as to which there may be considerable 
disagreement. "70 A command that orders a subordinate to commit a crime 
codified in the Rome Statute whose lawfulness is debatable is not very common. 
65 Sliedregt, above n 39, 339. 
66 Martha Minow "Living Up to Rules : Holding Soldiers Responsible for Abusive Conduct and 
the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence" (2007) 52 McGill LJ I , 5. 
67 Colonel Patrick Finnegan "Operational Law: Plan and Execute" ( 1996) 76 :2 Military Review 
29, 32. 
68 See description of the history of the defence, chapter II , for further references see Cassese, 
above n 63 , 239 . 
69 Ibid , 240 . 
70 US v Calley , above n 63 , 544. 
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The third condition requires that the command was not manifestly unlawful, 
meaning that the subordinates cannot be regarded as having "ought to know " 
that it was actually unlawful. 
Dr. Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad finds the fact that these conditions are 
cumulative "perplexing" .71 He comments that if a person did not recognise an 
order as being unlawful , they clearly did not know it was manifestly unlawful. 
This is indeed true, however, it is not relevant. It is important to note that the 
non-manifest illegality of the order is another objective element which has 
nothing to do with the ideas of the perpetrators themselves, but purely with how 
the court evaluates the case and the degree of illegality. 72 An order to commit a 
manifestly illegal crime is defective, because it is not within the authority of the 
superior ( or anyone) to order such an act. 73 Therefore, the command loses the 
binding effect.74 The court will classify the illegality of the crime. This depends 
on how the term man{festly unlawful is to be defined.75 
C Manifest Illegality of Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity 
Subsection 2 of article 33 of the Rome Statute excludes acts of genocide and 
crimes against humanity from the scope of the defence. As crimes against 
humanity require a systematic and widespread attack,76 and genocide the intent 
to destroy a certain group of people,77 they are qualified as manifestly unlawful 
beyond doubt. 78 Proof that a certain command ordering these crimes in a 
concrete situation has not been manifestly unlawful is not valid. This shows 
which level of atrocity is qualified as obviously intolerable. 
71 Dr Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad "The Rome Statute and Captain Planet: What lies between 
'Crimes Against Humanity ' and the 'Natural Environment ' ?" (2009) 19 Fordham Envtl L Rev 
265 , 272. 
72 Triffterer, abo ve n 37, at article 33 para 28; Sliedregt, above n 39, 325 . 
73 Keijzer, above n 48 , 23, 25. 
74 Ibid , 25 . 
75 See below. 
76 Rome Statute, Article 7. 
77 Ibid , Article 6. 
78 Sliedregt, above n 39, 325 . 
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IV MANIFEST ILLEGALITY 
The central question of article 33 is how manifest illegality is to be defined . 
First it is important to find out whether the unlawf ulness of the order, the fact 
that the order is against the law, does refer to the domestic law under which the 
perpetrator acts or to international criminal law. The first option would create a 
situation in which certain behaviour could not be qualified as a crime when the 
domestic law permits or requires the subordinate to do so. This would make it 
very simple for a terror regime to prevent their commanders from being 
punished by the International Criminal Court. They would only have to pass 
laws with a content that protects them. The Nuremberg Tribunal did not 
recognise the cover of domestic law as an excuse. 79 Clearly, the article 33 of the 
Rome Statute did not intend to open that door either. As a consequence, 
international criminal law is the threshold for unlawfulness. This is essential to 
make the ICC work, otherwise the whole construction would fall apart in every 
case. By ratifying the Rome Statute, states accept this position . Nevertheless, the 
wording of the Rome Statute leaves room for doubt and debate on this term. It is 
my opinion that international criminal law needs to be as precise as possible. 
This matter of controversy could be easily eliminated with an explanation that 
illegal refers to a breach of international criminal law. 
Next it is necessary to define when an act is manifestly illegal. This is especially 
important because, as just shown, in cases of a manifestly illegal order, 
subordinates are legally obliged to turn against their own legal system and to 
refuse to execute the command. They have to bear the possible legal 
consequences under their jurisdiction . As to whether such a thing as manifest 
illegality exists and if so what it means, there are various legal-philosophical 
theories. 80 
79 Trial of the Major War Criminals Before the International Military Tribunal , full text 
available at http ://avalon.law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp. 
80 The following text briefly summarises the three main theories . 
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A Natural Law 
Natural Law derives from Aristotle81 , who distinguished between " human law" 
and "natural law". 82 Natural law is characterised by three main components, 
identified by Cicero.83 
True law is right reason in agreement with Nature; it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting .... It is a sin to alter this law, not it is allowable to 
attempt to repeal any part of it, and it is impossible to abolish it entirely ... . [God] is 
the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. 
This means that a law beyond manmade rules exists regarding the core of right 
and wrong. This is also called "moral realism" or "moral truth" .
84 
Significant is 
that natural law is discernible through reason.
85 That means that everybody 
should be able to recognise it, and accordingly, avoid a violation. According to 
Aquinas, people who do not follow their inclination for the good, choose to act 
contrary to their essential, better nature.86 Because natural law is of a higher 
source than human law, it has greater authority.
87 Therefore, human law 
violating natural law is legally void.
88 
The problem with this doctrine is that it is very abstract. It is hard to deduce an 
applicable legal rule from it. 
81 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics quoted in Max Salomon Shellens "Aristotle on Natural Law" 
(1959)4 atLF72,85. 
82 Henry Mather "Natural Law and Liberalism" (2000 - 200 I) 52 S CL Rev 331, 332. 
83 Cicero quoted in Raymond Wacks Philosophy of Lmv (Oxford University Press, ew York, 
2006) 3. 
84 Mather, above n 82, 333. 
85 Wacks, above n 83, 3. 
86 St Thomas Aquinas Commen/ary on Aristolle's Nicomachean Ethics quoted in Mather, above 
n 82, 335. 
87 Mark Tebbit Philosophy of Law -An lntroduclion (2nd ed, Routledge, Abingdon, 2005) 12. 
88 Ibid, 12. 
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B Legal Positivism 
Legal positivism usually rejects a connection between law and morals. 89 The 
law, as it is laid down, has to be separated from law how it should be.90 
Unwritten standards cannot be expected to provide guidance; legal validity is to 
be identified formally and must be morally neutral , because morally abhorrent 
does not equal criminal.91 This is in accordance with the maxim of nullum 
crimen sine lege. This concept is of great importance for legal certainty and 
recognised by almost every jurisdiction.92 
Legally, this principle is much easier to apply but it also carries much greater 
risk. If anything can be law, anything can be enforceable. This can be easily 
abused and has been abused in the past. The National Socialists aimed to bind 
soldiers and jurists by the doctrines "An order is an order" and "A law is a 
law" 93. Although the first principle did not apply to criminal conduct, the latter 
knew no restrictions. 94 
C Radbruch 
Gustav Radbruch developed a formula that created a middle way between 
Natural Law and Legal Positivism. 
89 Ibid , 18 . 
90 Wacks, above n 83 , 19. 
91 Tebbit, above n 87, 36 . 
92 Susan Lamb ,,N11//11m Crimen, Nully Poena Sine Lege in International Criminal Law" in 
Antonia Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R W D Jones (ed) The Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 734 . 
93 Quoted in Gustav Radbruch "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law" printed in 
David Dyzenhaus, Arthur Ripstein, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau (ed) Lmv and Morality: Readings 
in Legal Philosophy (3 rd ed, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007) 127. 
94 Gustav Radbruch "Statutory Lawlessness and Supra-Statutory Law" printed in David 
Dyzenhaus, Arthur Ripstein, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau (ed) Lmv and Morality: Readings in 
Legal Philosophy (3 rd ed, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007) 127. 
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1 Radbruch 's Formula 
Radbruch united both approaches to a new legal rule.
95 
The conflict between justice and legal certainty should be resolved in that the 
positive law, established by enactment, and by power, has primacy even when its 
content justice reaches an intolerable level that the law is supposed to give way as a 
'false law ' to justice. It is impossible to draw a sharper line between the cases of 
legalized injustice and laws which remain valid despite their false content. But 
another boundary can be drawn with the utmost precision. Where justice is not even 
aimed at, where equality is deliberately disavowed in the enactment of a positive 
law, then the law is not simple 'false law', it has no claim at all to legal status. 
This usually means that positivistic law is to be followed. However, extreme 
injustice is no law and therefore, cannot have a binding effect. 
Radbruch is laying out a ground rule here and breaking it at the same time. He 
tries to unite the exclusive models of natural law and positivism, working out 
the core ideas of both approaches and putting them in context. He tries to raise 
and maintain legal security up to a point where it is not bearable anymore. 
2 Berlin Wall Shootings 
A famous (though domestic) series of cases dealing with the issue are the 
Mauerschutzenprozesse (Berlin Wall Shooting cases
96
). 
When Germany was separated in the Federal German Republic
97 
(West 
Germany) and the German Democratic Republic
98 (East Germany), people from 
East Germany were not allowed to leave the country without permission. In 
95 Gustav Radbruch "Gesetzliches Unrecht und i.ibergesetzliches Recht" ( 1946) in 
Rechtsphilosophie (5th ed, Koehler Verlag, 1956) 353, 354 quoted in English in : Giovannangelo 
De Francesco "Radbruch Formula and Criminal Law" (2003) I J lnt ' l Crim Just 728, 729. 
96 An English version of the first trial (BGHSt 39, I) is available at 
http ://www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/bgh/s92 l I 03.htm (accessed 20 February 20 I 0) . Parts 
especially interesting and relevant at para C I1 2 (b ). 
97 Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
98 Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
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section 213 of the German Democratic Republic Penal Code illegal border 
crossing was punishable with up to 5 years of imprisonment.99 Nevertheless, 
hundreds and thousands tried to flee . The members of the border troops had to 
ensure that no one left or entered the country illegally by all means. Section 27 
of the Borders of the German Democratic Republic Act [Gesetz iiber die 
Staatsgrenze der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik] allowed the use of fire 
arms as ultima ratio to prevent someone from committing a crime, which 
fleeing was. This was the so called SchiejJbefehl, the order to shoot. The border 
soldiers were supposed to shout first and give warnings, but eventually they had 
to shoot. According to subsection 4, the use of fire arms was not allowed against 
children, and young persons and women should be spared as far as possible. 
Subsection 5 stated that the life of the person should be spared as far as possible. 
The explanation of section 27 was part of the training of the border soldiers . The 
total number of deaths is unknown, historians estimate that around I , I 00 people 
died trying to escape. 100 
After the unification of Germany, 246 persons were put on trial , about half of 
whom were acquitted. The state leaders were indicted for giving the orders and 
passing the law, the subordinates were prosecuted for shooting. In these cases 
the Courts had to deal with the issue of superior orders. The shooters had only 
followed the law of their country and the orders of their superiors. Deadly force 
had explicitly been allowed if other means were not effective. 
The prosecution argued that murder had been prohibited under the German 
Democratic Penal Code 101 and that the justification of section 27 of the Border 
Act was void. The Judges of the first trial and the Court of Appeal 
102 affirmed 
99 StGB-DDR, text in German available at www.verfassungen.de/de/ddr/strafgesetzbuch74 
(accessed 20 February 20 I 0). 
100 Deutsche Welle "More Than I, 100 Berlin Wall Victims" (9 August 2005) www.dw-world .de 
(accessed 21 February 20 I 0) - This number includes victims of mines and booby-traps . 
10 1 Section 112. 
102 The appellate court was here the High Court for Criminal Cases . 
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this view. 103 The Court argued especially that section 27 of the Border Act was 
incompatible with the ICCPR. The German Democratic Republic had ratified 
the convention and therefore, the standards of the ICC PR had been applicable to 
the law. 104 
Because of the obvious, unendurable breach of basic dictates of justice and of 
human rights , which to protect is a duty of the German Democratic Repub lic as a 
ratifying party of the ICCPR, section 27 of the Border Act cannot justify the act. 
The High Court for Criminal Cases applied Radbruch ' s Formula. 
105 
It explained 
that the Berlin wall shootings did not have the same gravity of inhumanity as the 
national socialist's mass murders. However, the extreme injustice Radbruch 
described was not limited to genocide, war crimes or crimes against humanity or 
limited to the acts prohibited under the Geneva Conventions. The Court derived 
the manifest illegality of the wall shootings from an overall appraisal of the 
border regime. The Court stated that the determination of human life to be worth 
less than the protection of the border was unacceptable. Further, it explored the 
motives for the orders to shoot, the living situation in the German Democratic 
Republic and concluded that the judgment of the first instance had been correct. 
The cases of the convicted state leaders were brought before the German 
Supreme Court, which confirmed the legal interpretations of the first and second 
instances. 106 The order of the shootings had violated articles 12(2) and 6( 1) of 
the ICCPR. The law of the border regime was extremely unjust and therefore, 
no law. 
103 BGHSt39, 168, atpara 13,39. 
104 Ibid , at para 39 - ,,Wegen offensichtlichen, unertraglichen Verstol3es gegen elementare 
Gebote der Gerechtigkeit und gegen die Menschenrechte, die zu schiitzen sich die DDR als 
Vertragsstaat des lnternationalen Paktes Uber biirgerliche und politische Rechte vom 19. 
Dezember 1966 (GBI. DDR 19741157; BGBI. 1973 JI 1533) verpflichtet hatte, konnte § 27 des 
Grenzgesetzes der DDR in der Auslegung, die <lurch eine solche Staatspraxis gekennzeichnet 
war, keine rechtfertigende Wirkung entfalten." - translation done by the author; BGHSt 4 l , l O l , 
at para 11. 
105 BGHSt41 , 101 , atpara 17 - 21. 
106 f1 BYer GE 95 , 96, at para 69, 76 . 
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Of course, these decisions have been criticised. Susanne Walther reproaches the 
High Court with "dismissing in such short-cut fashion" 107 the possibility of a 
lack of intent of the defendants. However, the High Court mentioned that the 
border soldiers had been taught not to follow orders to act inhumanely. 108 They 
should have recognised the disproportionateness. The Supreme Court decision 
has been criticised for applying international criminal law doctrines, because 
only East German law should have been leading for the conviction. 109 However, 
the Court did not apply the ICCPR directly to the case but used it as a guidance 
for how the law of the German Democratic Republic had to be interpreted. This 
is convincing especially because the German Democratic Republic had ratified 
the convention. As there was no interpretation in accordance with human rights 
it could not be valid. 
D Interim Conclusion 
According to the naturalist manifest unlawfulness is given by nature. People are 
born with a sense of good and evil. If they choose to act against natural law, 
which is unchangeable, their behaviour goes against nature and is manifestly 
illegal. As long as domestic and international criminal law are analogous on 
such matters, a conviction is easy to justify. More legally challenging is to 
evaluate a situation where the order was consistent with the domestic law. Law 
is binding, that is a fundamental characteristic of law. It has to be enforceable to 
create legal security which is crucial for a functioning society. A legal term 
needs to be precise to guarantee fair trials and fair outcomes. That leaves us with 
Radbruch. His approach seems to be logically inconsequent and yet it works. A 
bottom line for lawfulness has to be set out. This is what the Rome Statute now 
calls manifest unlawfulness. 
107 Susanne Walther " Problems in Blaming and Punishing Individuals For Human Rights 
Violations: The Example of the Berlin Wall Shootings" ( 1993) I Eur J Crime Crim L & Crim 
Just 104, 116. 
108 BGHSt 39, I, at para 81 . 
109 Micah Goodman "After the Wall : Legal Ramifications of the East German Border Guard 
Trials in Unified Germany" (1996) 29 Cornell Int'l LJ 727, 765 . 
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There have been several judgments dealing with this issue. One of the most 
cited ones today draws an excellent picture of manifest unlawfulness which is 
probably as close to a definition as it could be. It is the Israeli case Chief 
Milita,y Prosecutor v Melinki. 11 0 
The identifying mark of a 'manifestly unlawful ' order must wave like a black flag 
above the order given, as a warning saying: 'forbidden' . It is not formal unlawfulness, 
hidden or half-hidden, not unlawfulness that is detectable only by legal experts, that 
is the important issue here, but an overt and salient violation of the law, a certain and 
obvious unlawfulness that stems from the order itself, the criminal character of the 
order itself or of the acts it demands to be committed, an unlawfulness that pierces 
and agitates the heart, if the eye be not blind nor the heart closed or corrupt. That is 
the degree of 'manifest' quality required in order to annul the soldier's duty to obey 
and render him criminally responsible for his actions . 
According to the judges in another case, a manifestly unlawful order must 
offend '·the conscience of every reasonable, right-thinking person."
111 
The court 
stated that an act of manifest illegality is something which goes against the very 
instincts of human beings . 
While for some time, a very positivistic approach had been recognised in 
domestic and international law, and the Nuremberg Trials followed a very strict 
naturalistic view of law, the drafters of the Rome Statute implemented 
Radbruch's model that had been applied in the judgments mentioned above. The 
general presumption of criminal liability shows that an obligation to disobey 
orders to commit a crime is given. This is the approach of natural law, which 
excludes any justification of a breach of that law. Radbruch's idea on this issue 
can be found in the exception of article 33 of the Rome Statute as a conditional 
liability approach. If the subordinate had no intention of committing a crime and 
''° Chief Milita,y Prosecutor v. Melinki Appeal 279-283 /58, 44 Psakim (Judgments of the 
District Courts of Israel) 362, cited in R v Fin/a 1994 Carswel!Ont 61 (Supreme Court of 
Canada) at para 134. 
111 R v Finta, above n l l O, at para 134. 
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the obligation to follow the order, they can exculpate themselves unless the 
conduct is extremely unjust. To keep the military a functioning body, soldiers 
must carry out orders. 11 2 Generally it is desirable that people follow the law. The 
Rome Statute recognises this up to a point from which it is not endurable 
anymore, outlined by subsection 2. 
Still , manifest illegality is a normative term. It defines an action on grounds of 
morality, an estimation of good and evil. These values are formed by social 
heritage, customs, faith , education and many more factors . While even people 
from the same culture argue about this, the abyss between cultures seems 
insuperable. On the other hand, we are all human beings. It is as simple as that 
because there are matters in which respect every single person in the world is 
equal. Not only for bodily needs, such as food and sleep, but also on moral 
levels there is common ground. Parts of the ideologies of the five major world 
religions 11 3 are identical. For example, the Christian and Jewish "Thou shalt not 
kill." 11 4 reads as "And do not take any human being's life - that God willed to be 
sacred - other than in [the pursuit of] justice." 115 in the Qur'an . This underlines 
the fact that some values, and consequently some law, is beyond manmade 
rules. It is something nearly every culture and society considers crucial for co-
existence, something more than reason. Natural law is a well-fitting term for 
this phenomenon. This feeling of justice, of a bottom line, comes naturally to 
human beings and those who lack it, cannot be part of society. Radbruch gave 
this feeling a legal right to exist and the judges gave it the symbol of a black 
flag. 
In consequence, the answer to the question whether one can be expected to 
break the law in extreme cases and (to a certain limit) bear the consequences is 
112 Insco, above n 39, 393. 
113 Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, Judaism - Encyclopa:dia Britannica "The 2005 
Annual Megacensus of Religions" Table I www.britannica.com (accessed 17 February 20 I 0) . 
11 4 The Bible, Exodus 20 : 13 . 
11 5 Qur'an, 17:33 . 
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY Of 
WELLINGTO LIBRARY 
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" Yes" . The moral responsibility of every human being for others for the purpose 
of upholding the core of justice, forces one to recognise the illegality of certain 
conduct and resist it. 
V CURRENT LEGAL DEBATES 
The praxis shows that the solution the Rome Statute offers, leaves some open 
questions and although all contracting parties agreed on the current version, 
there are still several matters open to discussion. 
A Breach of Customary International Law 
It 1s criticised that article 33 of the Rome Statute is a breach of customary 
international law. Customary international law results from "a general and 
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation 
[ • . • ]. " 11 6 This means that it arises from first state practise (material element) and 
second opinio juris (psychological element). States must act according to a 
certain rule over an appropriate period of time and recognise this rule as 
binding. 11 7 Customary international law is one of the most important sources for 
international law. 
Paola Gaeta states that the rejection of the defence of superior orders has been 
practised in international law for long enough to establish a rule of customary 
international law.11 8 Therefore, according to Gaeta, the current version of 
article 33 is not consistent with customary international law. 
lt is true that no one ever challenged the sections of the statutes of the ad hoe 
tribunals dealing with superior orders as being contrary to customary 
116 Boles law A Boczek International Law: A Dictionary (Scarecrow Press, Lanham, 2005), 30. 
117 Ibid . 
118 Gaeta, above n 29, 185 . 
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international law. 11 9 There seemed to be a universal understanding that the 
principle of absolute liability was the correct choice. Sliedregt counters this 
argument by stating that the absolute liability approach is grounded basically on 
the Nuremberg trials .120 Nuremberg, however, was such an extraordinary and 
unique trial that it cannot provide standards for customary international law. 12 1 
Furthermore, she argues, there have been attempts to include the conditional 
liability approach in the 1949 Geneva Conventions and in the 1977 Additional 
Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. 122 This proves that there has never been a 
general legal perception of the absolute liability doctrine. 
Lastly, it has to be acknowledged that some jurisdictions, both civil and 
common law, have an equivalent to the conditioned liability concept in their 
criminal law. For example the French and the Italian penal codes have such 
provisions. 123 In the United States, Canada and Australia the manifest liability 
approach is commonly accepted, too. 124 In national war crime trials it has even 
been applied to non-nationals. 125 The question is , whether national practise is 
irrelevant for international law rules and can undermine state practise or not. 
In my opinion, the application of the conditional liability approach in national 
cases conflicts with the concept of opinio juris. A criminal law concept is either 
valid for everyone, no matter what their nationality, or it is void. The notion to 
make a defence available to your own citizens but denying it to others is not 
acceptable and does not provide for state practise even when exercised. In my 
view, domestic and international handling of legal problems is linked and not 
119 Takemura, above n 4, I 63. 
120 Sliedregt, above n 39, 337. 
12 1 With further references : Ibid . 
122 Ibid . 
123 Massimo Scaliotti "Defences before the lnternatinoal Criminal Court: Substantive Grounds 
for Excluding Criminal Responsibility- Part I" (200 I) I lnt'I Crim L Rev 111 , I 27. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Sliedregt, above n 39,337 . 
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separable. Therefore, the absolute liability approach has not become customary 
international law. 
B War Crimes 
Since the day the Rome Statute came into force, the black flag of manifest 
illegality waves officially over genocide and crimes against humanity. Article 
33 does not mention war crimes. This means that war crimes must reach a level 
of gravity comparable to genocide or crimes against humanity to be manifestly 
unlawful. This is one of the aspects most criticised about article 33. The ICC has 
jurisdiction over the most serious crimes of humankind and yet war crimes are 
not described as manifestly unlawful. This seems unreasonable to some as war 
crimes are grave violations of humanitarian law. 126 The detailed nature of 
article 8 of the Rome Statute indicates very clearly which acts are war crimes 
and therefore unlawful. 127 Paola Gaeta calls every order "which constitutes a 
grave breach of the 1949 Geneva Conventions" obviously illegal.
128 
According 
to her point of view, one cannot qualify a crime as serious while at the same 
time deny the status of a manifest unlawfulness. 129 Antonio Cassese is in 
agreement with her and takes the matter further. According to Cassese the ICC 
Statute is very clear on the extent and illegality of war crimes.
130 
[A]ny serviceman is expected and required to know whether the act he is about to 
commit falls under the category of war crimes and must be aware of whether or 
not the execution of a superior order involves the commission of such a crime. 
Given the usual living conditions in the countries that were recently involved in 
or currently suffer under international and national armed conflicts, this 
statement must surprise. The average level of education in those countries is 
126 Gaeta, above n 29, l 85; Cassese, above n 63, 241. 
127 Wattad, above n 71,272; Gaeta, above n 29, 190. 
128 Gaeta, above n 29, 185. 
129 [bid . 
13° Cassese, above n 63, 24 l 
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low. The availability of information is poor and the military training often basic. 
It is doubtful that many members of the Sudan Liberation Movement are 
lectured about the fact that they have the obligation to refuse to obey orders to 
commit a war crime. It is even more doubtful that in case of a new Rwandan 
rebellion, participants would know what war crimes are. Finally, it is highly 
doubtful that even a few Afghan soldiers have any idea of the existence of the 
Rome Statute at all. Therefore, Cassese's claim that anyone should know about 
both, the definition of the Rome Statute of war crimes and the duty to disobey 
such an order in this general extended form, seems unfair and unrealistic. The 
Rome Statute was written by highly educated people, who gave the wording a 
lot of time and thought. Therefore, the Rome Statute is an academic text, that 
cannot be easily understood by someone untrained in this area at all, who was 
raised in a country where human rights are not a matter of course. Assuming 
that all Afghan soldiers were able to read and were provided with a copy of the 
Rome Statute, it is highly unlikely that they would understand for example the 
meaning of article 8(2)(a)(vi): "Wilfully depriving a prisoner of war or other 
protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial;" How are they supposed 
to know what a "fair and regular trial" in this context means? Im my opinion, 
Cassese's argument only applies to people with military, political or legal 
education. 
Cassese argues further that the non-inclusion of war crimes might lead to unfair 
results. 131 As cumulative charges are allowed, 132 the prosecution might 
circumvent the defence of superior orders. 133 He fears that the punishment for a 
crime would depend on establishing whether the crime is qualified as a crime 
13 1 Ibid 241; affirmative Sliedregt, above n 39, 326. 
132 Prosecutor v Akayesu Case No ICTR-96-4-T (Chamber I, Trial Judgment) (2 September 
I 998); see with further references in ICTR and ICTY trials: Hong S Wills ,,Cumulative 
Convictions and the Double Jeopardy Rule: Pursuing Justice at the ICTY and the ICTR" (2003) 
17 Emory lnt'I L Rev 341 , 358. 
m Andreas Zimmermann "Superior Orders" in Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R W D 
Jones (ed) The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I 
(Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 972. 
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against humanity or an act of genocide, in which case the defence of superior 
orders cannot be raised, or as a war crime, in which case the defence can be 
pleaded. 134 This would indeed be legally unacceptable. 
135 
However, there is no 
danger of that happening. As mentioned before, article 33(2) sets out a threshold 
for manifest illegality. If a war crime can also be qualified as a crime against 
humanity, it is without doubt manifestly illegal. As a consequence the defence 
of superior orders cannot be applied. If the defence of superior orders applies , 
the crime cannot be of such gravity as to qualify as a crime against humanity. 
Regarding the argument that the Rome Statute has jurisdiction over the most 
serious crimes and that this choice of words indicates the manifest illegality of 
all crimes within this jurisdiction, it has to be noted that not all war crimes are of 
equal cruelty. It is true that most crimes described in article 8 of the Rome 
Statute are hideous and will surely be of manifest illegality. However, there is a 
clear ranking. "Making improper use of a flag of truce, of the flag or of the 
military insignia and uniform of the enemy [ ... ] resulting in death or serious 
personal injury;" 136 is hardly as inhumane as torture
137
. While anyone who can 
feel pain and fear, should recognise the intolerability of torture, it is not 
completely incomprehensible to use tricks to win a battle. The non-qualification 
of a crime as manifestly unlawful does not make it any less a crime punishable 
under and taken seriously by the Rome Statute. 
Another aspect, why war crimes are not qualified as manifestly illegal per se 
might be the fact that they are typically (though not exclusively) committed by 
military or paramilitary persons who according to some scholars shall be 
protected further 138 to honour the extraordinary circumstances of the military. 
This results from a sociological concept Nico Keijzer calls acceptance of 
134 Cassese, above n 63, 241 . 
135 Sliedregt, above n 39, 326. 
136 Rome Statute, art 8(2)(b)(vii ). 
137 Ibid , art 8(2)(a)(ii ). 
138 Triffterer, above n 31 , at article 33 para 31. 
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power. 139 The fact that the power-subjects accept the influence the power-holder 
exercises without resistance as rightful leads to a relationship of trust. It is a 
circle 140 : The subordinate wishes to follow the guidance which in turn 
strengthens the power of the commander. A military commander is presumed to 
give legal orders. 141 The duty to obey them is based on that presumption. 142 This 
makes their relationship special and should be reflected in the defence. A more 
lenient handling seems justified. 143 
Finally, I agree with Sliedregt that the emphasis of crimes against humanity and 
genocide in paragraph 2 of article 33 of the Rome Statute causes more 
discussion than it is actually worth. 144 The manifest illegality approach alone 
would lead to the very same results , because crimes against humanity and acts 
of genocide are of such abomination that they are manifestly unlawful anyway. 
A differentiation between war crimes and crimes against humanity or genocide 
does not add any legal aspects and , therefore, was not strictly necessary. 
Sliedregt is of the opinion paragraph 2 should have been omitted .145 I think it 
provides guidance to what is manifestly unlawful beyond doubt. It defines a 
threshold and therefore, is very useful. The scope of application of the defence 
of superior orders is narrow. Only a small portion of the crimes codified in the 
Rome Statute will not reach the level of manifest unlawfulness. After all , the 
Rome Statute deals with the most serious crimes . The ICC does not hold a trial 
for every single participant of an armed conflict, who may have stepped out of 
line, but it only deals with the most serious cases. So in reality, chances that 
someone is brought before the ICC, whose crimes may or may not have been 
manifestly illegal, are even smaller. Nevertheless, it has to deal with this 
question, when evaluating single incidents, but I daresay that a conviction will 
139 Keijzer, above n 48 , 18 . 
140 Ibid, 19, 20 . 
14 1 Keijzer, above n X, 282, 283. 
142 Sliedregt, above n 39, 340. 
143 Ibid . 
144 Ibid, 338 . 
145 Ibid, 341. 
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hardly ever stand or fall on that question. For this reason, I propose to 
concentrate on issues that will actually make a difference. The inclusion of war 
crimes in paragraph 2 of article 33 would make the defence redundant, because 
there would be nothing left to apply it to. So the hidden question in this 
discussion is the right of the defence to exist.
146 
C Aggression 
The fourth crime in the Rome Statute, which the ICC will gain jurisdiction over 
once it is defined 147 , next to acts of genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes is the crime of aggression. As war crimes it is not mentioned in 
paragraph 2 of a1ticle 33 of the Rome Statute. However, that does not imply that 
aggression is not manifestly illegal and can be object to the defence of superior 
orders. 
It has to be said that evaluating the crime of aggression is challenging, as most 
people agree that it has yet to be defined. 148 Benjamin Ferencz has an opposing 
point of view and claims that "aggression has already been adequately 
defined. " 149 Be that as it may, what we know about the crime of aggression is 
enough to determine two main points. Firstly, it definitely is manifestly 
unlawful. Without an official definition by the Rome Statute, this statement is 
not completely waterproof, but the main ideas are largely uncontroversial.
150 
Based on the proposed definitions that have been considered in international 
discussions, I agree with Ferencz and the International Military Tribunal at 
14 6 This is discussed below. 
147 Rome Statute, art 5(2). 
148 Mark A Drumbl "The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost Amid the Gains" 
(2009) 41 Case W Res J Int'l L 291 , 291 ; Sergey Sayapin "A Great Unknown : The Definition of 
Aggression Revisited" (2008-2009) 17 Mich St J lnt'l L 377, 377; This might happen this year at 
the conference in Uganda . 
149 Benjamin B Ferencz "Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression" (2009) 41 Case W Res 
J lnt'l L 281 , 281. 
150 Takemura, above n 4, 175 . 
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Nuremberg (IMTN) that aggression 1s the "supreme international crime" 151• 
Article 6(a) of the IMT Charter defined crimes against peace as "planning, 
preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of 
international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common 
plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the foregoing" 152 • Article I 
of the annex to the General Assembly Resolution 3314 from 1974 reads: 
"Aggression is the use of armed force by a State against the sovereignty, 
territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other 
manner inconsistent with the Charter of the United Nations [ ... ]." 153 The 
discussion paper on the crime of aggression of 2008 took up these 
formulations. 154 The bottom line of the crime is one state attacking another 
without being justified. Three main justifications are commonly considered: I. 
self-defence, 2. defence of an ally, 3. liberation of oppressed people. 155 
Attacking another state for no reason than wanting to do so has the black flag of 
unlawfulness waving and screaming over its head. It is, so to say, the core of all 
crimes just with more horrid consequences than most other crimes. I consider it 
especially dangerous, because it creates situations that provoke the commission 
of the other crimes of the Rome Statute. Crimes against humanity can happen 
without aggression, but aggression without crimes against humanity being 
committed is unlikely. An act that sets the cause for manifestly illegal crimes 
has to be manifestly unlawful itself. Important to note in this context is this 
proposal of the discussion paper: 156 
./. insert the following text after article 25, paragraph 3, of the Statute: 
3 bis 
151 The International Military Tribunal at uremberg, full text available at http ://avalon . 
law.yale.edu/subject_menus/imt.asp, cited in Ferencz, above n 149, 281 , 290 . 
152 IMT Charter art 6(a), full text available at http ://avalon.law.yale .edu/ imt/ imtconst.asp. 
153 GA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974), annex art I. 
154 Discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman (revision June 2008) 
(14 May 2008) JCC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2. 
155 Larry May "Aggression , Humanitarian Intervention, and Terrorism" (2009) 41 Case W Res J 
Int'I L 321 , 324. 
156 Discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman, above n 154. 
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In respect of the crime of aggression, the provisions of this article shall apply only 
to persons in a position effectively to exercise control over or to direct the political 
or military action ofa State. 
In the context of the defence of superior orders, more detailed information is not 
necessary to conclude that it cannot be a valid defence for the crime of 
aggression. Subordinates are "beyond the personal scope of this crime"
157
. 
Aggression is a leader-crime, a crime of states, more precisely as individuals are 
criminally responsible 158 , a crime of superiors not of subordinates. It is 
something that cannot be ordered. It is abstract, more an idea and a decision. 
What actually happens is war. 
A case that underlines this perception is US v Huet-Vaughn. 1
59 Captain Yolanda 
Huet-Vaughn was a doctor enlisted in the US army reserves. She was called to 
go to Saudi-Arabia to serve in the 1991 Gulf war against Iraq. Huet-Vaughn did 
not follow the call and argued : " I am refusing orders to be an accomplice in 
what I consider an immoral , inhumane and unconstitutional act, namely an 
offensive military mobilization in the Middle East." 160 In 1995 she was 
convicted for desertion "with intent to avoid hazardous duties and to shirk 
important service" 161. ln court, Huet-Vaughn raised the then so-called 
"Nuremberg" defence, based on resistance to manifestly unlawful orders. The 
Court rejected the defence by arguing this was a political question and non-
justiciable. Huet-Vaughn had not been able to demonstrate that she had been 
specifically commanded to commit a war crime and, therefore, would not be 
excused . This reasoning shows clearly that the political decision to go to war, be 
157 Takemura, above n 4, 176. 
158 Takemura, above n 4, 173 . 
159 US v Huet- Vaughn (28 December 1995) 43 MJ 105 . 
160 Yolanda Huet-Vaughn "Statement Refusing to Serve in the l 991 Gulf War" (9 January l 991) 
printed in Howard Zinn , Anthony Arnove (ed) Voices of a People 's History in the United States 
(Seven Stories Press, New York, 2004) 555 , 556 . 
161 US v Huet- Vaughn, above n 159, at para 33. 
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f 
it justified or not, is nothing that could be ordered. Therefore, it cannot be object 
to the defence of superior orders. 
D Moral Dilemma 
Some scholars who deal with the problem of manifest illegality and superior 
orders state that this problem is not purely academic, but that it causes a 
practical dilemma for the subordinate of whether to carry out an illegal order or 
not. 162 The soldier wishes to follow their commander and feels bound to them. 
The obligation to disobey the superior might overstrain the subordinate. 
This may have passed as a reasonable concern, if the Rome Statute had not been 
yet introduced and the moral choice test was still a matter of discussion. 
However, today this assumption is false. The non-recognition of the 
unlawfulness is one of the three conditions of the exemption in article 33. Had 
the subordinate detected the illegality of the act, the defence of superior orders 
could not be raised anymore. Therefore, the subordinates could not possibly find 
themselves in a situation of a moral dilemma because they must have been 
completely ignorant of the issue. 
However, there is a situation that might cause a moral dilemma for the judges. 
The Rome Statute is clear on the point of manifest unlawfulness of crimes 
against humanity and genocide: The perpetrator is guilty and must be punished. 
As explored above, this is fair because a minimum degree of human compassion 
can be naturally expected from everyone. A question that occurs is whether 
everyone includes people who have been raised in the most horrible 
environment imaginable? If a child is recruited as a child soldier at a young age 
and learns to survive by playing by the rules , can it be criminally liable the day 
it turns 18 and is suddenly no more a child? Assumed, an 18-year old is on trial 
162 For example: Ziv Bohrer "Clear and Obvious - A Critical Examination of the Superior Order 
Defense in Israeli Case Law" (2005 - 2006) 2 JDF LR 197, 197; Mi now, above n 66, 5; 
Scaliotti , above n 123 , 126. 
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for crimes against humanity. What if they could have walked away, but as it is 
the only life they have known, they just keep killing? Child soldiers kill because 
it is what they have been doing for the past ten years, because it is what they 
know and maybe what they are good at. The more they kill , the more power and 
appreciation they gain in the group, the better their life feels. 
163 
According to the Rome Statute they are criminally liable. They would not be 
able to raise the defence of superior orders because they were not obliged to 
carry out the orders of their superiors as they are not a legally binding authority. 
Neither can the mens rea be negated, because they know what they are doing. 
Lastly, if their doings are manifestly unlawful , the defence is suspended 
anyway. No other defence seems to be available either. There is neither duress 
nor mistake of fact or law. Possibly, one could argue the defence of mental 
disease or defect. However, Article 31 (1 )(a) refers to diseases and defects such 
as mental disorders or impairments rather than to lost childhoods.
164 A mental 
dysfunction causes the inability of the accused to recognise the consequences of 
their behaviour, limits their learning capability and restricts their understanding 
of their surroundings. 165 It is a clinical expression. Although growing up as a 
child soldier might cause such defects, is does not necessarily have to and it 
would be incorrect to conclude that every child soldier is mentally ill. This will 
definitely not apply to those who accept the life and try to function as a member 
of the group. 
A case study in Mozambique showed that former child soldiers can return to 
normal lives, usually with the help of a rehabilitation program.
166 They have 
jobs, care for their children, are good spouses. Only few so far chose a violent 
lifestyle or were so profoundly disturbed that they could not return into 
163 Neil Boothby "What happens when child soldiers grow up? The Mozambique case study" 
Intervention 2006, Volume 4, Number 3, 244, 249 
164 Stanley Yeo "Insanity Defense in the Criminal Laws of the Commonwealth of Nations" 
(2008) 2008 Sing J Legal Stud 241 , 246. 
165 Ibid , 247 . 
166 Boothby, above n 163 , 245. 
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society. 167 This shows that even a terrible childhood must not necessarily 
destroy the natural sense of values in a person forever. However, that is after 
these people had had help and gained a perspective. 
I believe, this is a problem which has to be discussed under the heading of 
superior orders, because this is the defence that matches their legal and actual 
situation best. The defence of superior orders relieves one from criminal 
culpability if the person has been in a situation that they could not control and 
could not be expected to control. It focuses on the outer circumstances rather 
than on the state of mind. The mens rea is negated on grounds of the situation 
given. This is exactly what happened to the child soldier. The defence of defect 
on the contrary, focuses on an destroyed inner state of mind of the accused, 
which given the hideous extraordinary life surroundings of a child soldier is 
rather inappropriate. 
Generally, growing up under a regime of injustice cannot work as a defence . 
This can be shown by looking at an example case from the Third Reich. Baldur 
von Schirach was born in J 907. 168 He joined a patriotic youth organisation at the 
age of ten. In 1925, age 17, he became member of the NSDAP, the social-
nationalist party. 169 In the following year, he met Hitler at his parent's home. 170 
On that day, he became an even greater admirer than he had been before. In 
1931 von Schirach became Reich Youth Leader at the age of24.171 He was also 
Gauleiter of Vienna. Under his power over 185,000 Jews were deported from 
Vienna to the ghettos of Poland. In 1946 he was sentenced to 20 years of 
imprisonment for crimes against humanity.172 
167 Ibid . 
168 "Baldur von Schirach" www.annefrank .dk (accessed 23 February 20 I 0). 
169 Robert Aitkne, Marilyn Aitken "Pride and Prejudice: The Dark Side of Henry Ford" (2005-
2006) 32 Litigation 53 , 58 
170 Eugene Davidson The Trial of the Germans: an account of the twenty-two defendants before 
the International Milita,y Tribunal at Nuremberg (University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 
I 997) 286. 
171 Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law--International Military Tribunal 
(Nuremburg), Judgment and Sentences (1947) 41 Am J Jnt'I L 117,332 
172 Ibid, 127; Aitkne, Aitken, above n 169, 58 . 
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The difference between a child growing up m the Third Reich and a child 
soldier lies in the education. Children who grew up in the Third Reich were 
taught to hate, fear and fight Jews. Aside from that, however, they led a normal 
life. They had family and friends they loved and were also loved. They went to 
school and made plans for their future. If one grows up in this way, the person is 
able to develop a sense of justice, and as an adult, this person should be able to 
reflect on their education. They should detect the flaw. Child soldiers on the 
other hand lost their family early. They grew up without love, without 
education. There is nothing they could reflect on and - most important - they 
might not even know that another kind of life exists. One cannot be expected to 
make a choice when one does not know the options . On the other hand, crimes 
against humanity cannot be tolerated by society. 
Obviously, the Rome Statute cannot excuse unlawful acts because of an 
unhappy childhood, but growing up as a child soldier can (though it does not 
have to) numb the natural feeling for life. Therefore, I think that the Rome 
Statute does not offer a legally satisfying solution. I imagine that the problem 
could be practically solved by the prosecution not bringing charges, but that still 
leaves a gap in the Jaw for this morally challenging situation. 
VI NO NEED FOR THE DEFENCE OF SUPERIOR ORDERS? 
People who have committed a crime codified in the Rome Statute shall go 
unpunished only in rare exceptions where there is a good reason. The scope of 
the defence of superior orders is very narrow, the conditions are strict. In cases 
of genocide and crimes against humanity the plea cannot be raised, because they 
are qualified as manifestly unlawful. Aggression cannot be a matter of the 
defence either. This limits the scope of application to war crimes. Additionally, 
the Rome Statute knows more instruments of law that are similar to the defence 
of superior orders mentioned and which might make it redundant. 
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A Article Jl(l)(d) - The Defence of Duress 
Having acknowledged the duty to bear the consequences of a resistance to 
superior orders, the defence of superior orders has to be distinguished from the 
defence of duress, circumscribed in article 31 ( 1 )( d) of the Rome Statute. In both 
cases, someone is forced by some degree of coercion or compulsion to behave 
in a certain way. 173 Law should not create a situation where the person "[may] 
be liable to be shot by a court-martial if he disobeys an order and to be hanged 
by a judge and jury if he obeys it." 174 
This is almost exactly what happened to Drazen Erdemovic. Erdemovic, a 
Bosnian Croat, was a soldier in the Bosnian Serb Army. 175 In July 1995, he 
found himself being a member of the firing squad who killed around 1,200 
Bosnian Muslims in groups of ten . It is unsure how many were killed by 
Erdemovic; he estimates 70 boys and men. 176 He said: 177 
Your Honour, I had to do this . If l had refused , I would have been killed together 
with the victims . When I refused , they told me: "If you feel sorry for them , stand up . 
Line up with them and we will kill you too ." I am not sorry for myself but for my 
wife and son ... 
The defences of superior orders and duress were considered in all judgments but 
rejected by the first Trial Chamber178, the Appeal Chamber 179 and the second 
Trial Chambcr. 180 
173 Andrew Bowers "A Concession to Humanity in the Killing of Innocents - Validating the 
Defences of Duress and Superior Orders in International Law" (2003) 15 Windsor Rev Legal & 
Soc Issues 31, 32. 
174 K K Mathew "Right to Rebellion and Obedience to Superior Orders" in ( I 983) Three 
Lectures 44, 54, 55 quoted in : Insco, above n 39, 397. 
175 Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) (Sentencing Judgement, 
ICTY Trial Chamber I) hereafter [Sentencing Judgement I] available at www.icty .org (accessed 
I December 2009) at para 2. 
176 Ibid, at para 78 . 
177 Ibid , at para I 0 . 
178 Ibid, at para 16 . 
179 Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) (Sentencing Appeal , ICTY 
Appeal Chamber) available at www.icty.org (accessed I December 2009) at para 19. 
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Article 31 (1 )( d) of the Rome Statute provides a very different view on this 
issue. It reads: 
(I) In addition to other grounds for excluding criminal responsibility provided for in 
this Statute, a person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of that 
person's conduct: 
(d) The conduct which is alleged to constitute a crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Court has been caused by duress resulting from a threat of imminent death or of 
continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against that person or another person , 
and the person acts necessarily and reasonably to avoid this threat, provided that the 
person does not intend to cause a greater harm than the one sought to be avoided . 
This change is a much more radical one than for the defence of superior orders . 
No one can fairly be expected to resist a certain threat. 181 The Statute hereby 
follows a common civil law principle. 182 In contrast to the defence of superior 
orders a choice is not possible. Some national jurisdictions do not accept the 
defence in such a broad way. The New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 , for example, 
excludes various crimes such as murder, wounding with intent or robbery from 
the scope of application of the defence of compulsion.183 Other jurisdictions 
take the defence further than the Rome Statute, and allow for the defence not 
only when life or bodily integrity is endangered. Section 34 of the German 
Penal Code, for example, reads 184 
Whoever, faced with an imminent danger to life, limb, freedom, honour, property 
or another legal interest which cannot otherwise be averted, commits an act to 
avert the danger from himself or another, does not act unlawfully, if, upon 
180 Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (5 March 1998) (Sentencing Judgement, 
ICTY Trial Chamber I) available at wv,w.icty.org (accessed I December 2009) at para 17 -
Erdemovic was finally sentenced to 5 years in prison . 
181 Kai Ambos "General Principles Of Criminal Law In The Rome Statute" ( 1999) I O Criminal 
Law Forum I, 27 , 28. 
182 Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Olivia Swaak-Goldman Substantive and procedural aspects of 
international criminal law: the experience of international and national courts Volume 2 Part 2 
(Kluwer Law International , The Hague, 2000) 1456. 
183 New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 , s 24. 
184 
German Penal Code, s 34( I) - translation www.iuscomp.org (accessed I O February 20 I 0). 
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weighing the conflicting interests, in particular the affected legal interests and the 
degree of danger threatening them, the protected interest substantially outweighs 
the one interfered with. 
This defence is very important, especially in the Rome Statute. In my opinion, a 
person cannot be expected to give their life or risk the lives of their beloved 
ones for the protection of another person's life. The wording of article 31 ( I )(d) 
honours the gravity of the crimes in the Rome Statute and offers a realistic 
evaluation about what can be expected from humans even in times of war, at the 
same time. If we accept that there is such a thing as manifest illegality, which is 
something superior than any human law, than we have to accept that in a 
situation of imminent threat to their life a person will defend it by all means. 
This is not a choice, it is beyond that. It is another aspect of natural law. 
Once very similar, the defences developed very differently. Still, they are 
commonly raised together. 185 Possibly, that is because both situations cause a 
similar feeling of helplessness in the perpetrator. 
B Article 32 - The Defence of Mistake 
Article 32 of the Rome Statute describes the defences of mistake of fact or 
mistake of law. 
I. A mistake of fact shall be a ground for excluding criminal responsibility only if 
it negates the mental element required by the crime. 
2. A mistake of Jaw as to whether a particular type of conduct is a crime within 
the jurisdiction of the Court shall not be a ground for excluding criminal 
responsibility. A mistake of Jaw may, however, be a ground for excluding 
criminal responsibility if it negates the mental element required by such a crime, 
or as provided for in article 33. 
185 Cassese, above n 63, 246. 
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I Mistake of Fact and Superior Orders 
The mistake of fact is an error about a descriptive element of a crime.
186 
To 
have a guilty state of mind the accused must have knowledge of the factual 
elements of the crime. 187 The mistake cannot result from negligence, but must 
be based on the honest and reasonable belief that the circumstances are different 
from how they are in actuality. 188 Assumed, the reality was like the perpetrator 
imagined, they would not have committed a crime. As a consequence, the 
perpetrator has no criminal mind. This was affirmed in the case Michael A 
Schwarz before a US Court Martial. 189 Private Schwarz was relieved from guilt 
for murders he committed because he had honestly and reasonably believed , he 
and his patrol were under attack. 190 
In the context of superior orders, the subordinate might not recognise the 
illegality of an order, because they err about the content. It is possible that 
someone acted on an unlawful order because they were mistaken about a factual 
element of the order, precisely, the element that made it illegal. For example, a 
soldier is ordered to blow up a building, which, unrealised by the soldier, had 
been turned into a civilian kindergarten. 191 In the course of action children are 
killed . Then the soldier erred about his obligation to follow that order because 
he was wrong about the use of the building. At first sight this seems to be 
another problem of superior orders. However, firstly , that is not possible for 
systematical reasons. The error of the soldier is grounded on a mistake of fact 
and article 33 of the Rome Statute, as it is mentioned in paragraph 2 of article 
32, belongs to the mistakes of law. Secondly, the accused cannot rely upon the 
defence of superior orders, because the manifest illegality of the crime, as it is 
186 Sliedregt, above n 39,303. 
187 R v Finta, above n 110, at para 116. 
188 Cassese, above n 63 , 251. 
189 See in Susan Bandes " 'We the People' and Our Enduring Values" (1997-1998) 96 Mich L 
Rev 1376 (Crime and Punishment), 1426, 1427; Cassese, above n 63 ,25 1,252. 
190 He continued killing civilians, though , after realising the mistake and was therefore, 
sentenced to life imprisonment for the other murders. 
19 1 Example is based on an case read at Sliedregt, above n 39, 303. 
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an objective element, suspends it. It is also not a mistake of law on grounds of 
the soldier's error about the binding effect of the order, because this mistake was 
only a consequence of a factual error. The accused would have to plead the 
defence of mistake of fact and claim that the mistake negated the mens rea of 
the crime. 192 
Another possibility is a factual mistake about the authority of the superior. For 
example, a person presents themselves as an officer and the subordinate has 
honest reason to believe them to be a superior. If, as a consequence, they obey 
the order, which is illegal, but not manifestly illegal, and whose illegality they 
do not recognise, they have made a factual mistake. However, neither 
article 32(a) nor article 33 of the Rome Statute offer a defence. 193 They did not 
err about a factual element of the crime nor where they under an obligation to 
obey the command. The German Penal Code solves this problem with an 
instrument called Erlaubnistatbestandsirrtum. 194 This is insofar different from 
the mistake of fact as the perpetrator does not err about any factual element of 
the crime itself, but errs about the factual elements of a justification. 195 If the 
situation were like they honestly and reasonably believe, their behaviour would 
be justified or excused. In this case the justification would be the order. 
Sliedregt only mentions the defence of duress as a possible solution for such a 
situation. 196 However, without any form of compulsion, it cannot be raised. The 
Rome Statute does not address this problem further. In my opinion, article 32( I) 
should include this mistake because the accused has no more criminal intention 
than the one that is mistaken about facts of the crime itself. 
192 Gary D Solis "Obedience to Orders" (2004) 2 J lnt'I Crim Just 988, 997. 
193 Sliedregt, above n 39, 325. 
194 An explanation of the word: Error (lrrtum) about facts (Tatsachen) that would allow 
(Erlauben) the action = putative justification. 
195 Kai Ambos "Toward a Universal System of Crime: Comments on George Fletcher's 
Grammar of Criminal Law" (2006-2007) 28 Cardozo L Rev 2647, 2661 . 
196 Sliedregt, above n 39, 325. 
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2 Mistake of Law and Superior Orders 
The mistake of law is an error about a normative element of a crime.
197 
Generally, it is not accepted as a defence, because no one should be able to hide 
behind ignorance of law. 198 Practically all jurisdictions know the principle 
ignorantia legis non excusat. 199 However, in special cases in which there is a 
lack of mens rea the criminal responsibility shall be excluded. Not all states 
accept an exception from that rule, the defence of the mistake of law. 
200 
The 
Rome Statute allows for the consideration of such an excuse if the accused can 
prove that they have not "been aware of the social meaning of the material 
elements of the crime"20 1. The test, whether this is such a case or not, is similar 
to the one used to evaluate manifest illegality. The sense of an ordinary person 
is the lowest benchmark.202 If an average person understands the legal situation, 
the perpetrator should have too. However, international criminal law sets the 
threshold slightly differently and evaluates how the accused according to their 
education, training and intelligence should have judged the situation.203 This is 
necessary, because of the seriousness of the crimes dealt with. An important 
issue in this context is the question, what exactly can be expected of people. 
People are supposed to know the laws that rule the country. This makes sense, 
because otherwise non-compliance with the law would always be excused with 
ignorance.204 Yet, it is debatable whether people can be expected to know 
international law regulations as well. As mentioned above, there is no need for 
an explicit prohibition in domestic law of manifestly illegal crimes. Anyone has 
to understand that those acts are intolerably atrocious and , therefore, anyone has 
to refrain from committing them. However, as shown, there are acts , though 
few, which are not as obviously illegal. Further, there is no duty for ratifying 
197 Ibid, 303 . 
198 Ibid . 
199 For example ew Zealand, Crimes Act 1961 s 25 . 
200 Examples for the defence: Germany, Penal Code section 17; France, Criminal Code art 122-
3; Austria, Criminal Codes 9. 
20 1 Sliedregt, above n 39,305 . 
202 Ibid, 304 . 
203 Ibid ; Cassese, above n 63 , 263. 
204 Cassese, above n 63 , 256 . 
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states to include the principles of international law in their own codes. As shown 
above, there is no practicable alternative. The Rome Statute sets the standards 
for international criminal trials. Therefore, a defence cannot be based on 
ignorance of the code alone. Nevertheless, when international criminal law 
differs from national law and the defendant has acted accordingly to the law of 
their state, this should be an indication for the honest belief of the accused that 
the action was allowed. In that case depending on further circumstances, the 
defence of superior orders might apply. The wording of article 32(2) of the 
Rome Statute makes clear that the defence of superior orders is a subcategory of 
the mistake of law. Chances that this actually happens are low, because most 
jurisdictions punish the crimes listed in the Rome Statute in some variation or 
the other anyway. 
In the case of a subordinate following a superior command which orders them to 
commit an illegal crime, there are different aspects that the subordinate can err 
about. Firstly, they might recognise the illegality of the ordered act but think 
that it was within the authority of their superior to order such a conduct, so that 
they are still bound by it and need to obey. This is a mistake of law regarding 
the binding effect of orders. Secondly, they might think that the ordered act was 
legal, because, for example, they think in times of war this particular behaviour 
is allowed. This is a mistake of law regarding the prohibition of the act. In both 
cases the conviction would depend on the reasonableness of the belief and on 
the degree of illegality of the crime. A criminal mind cannot be negated for 
manifestly illegal crimes. 
All of the defences mentioned, concentrate on a lack of mens rea. Mens rea is 
an evil state of mind or criminal intent.205 To be criminally liable the actor must 
have a criminal mind, which means they acted ·'purposely" (intention to cause 
the criminal consequence of the action), "knowingly" ( conscious awareness of 
205 Encyclopredia Britannica " mens rea" www.britannica .com (accessed 20 Feburary 20 I 0) . 
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the result) , " recklessly" ( conscious disregard of the risk) or "negligently"206 
(inadvertence to the foreseeable danger). 
C Interim Conclusion 
As shown above, the Rome Statute offers various defences. The question ts , 
whether article 33 closes an otherwise unlawfully open gap. The scope of 
application of the defence of superior orders is narrow. Are cases imaginable, in 
which aiticle 33 is the only defence available for the accused? Those who argue 
for an inclusion of war crimes in article 33 could just as well argue for the 
abolishment. 
Yet, the defence is as old as law itself. In my opinion, that is , because law is 
more than just a catalogue of general rules. The Rome Statute does not only 
forbid murder, but murder as a war crime, murder as a crime against humanity 
and murder as genocide. Law reflects the sense of justice of society. This is , 
how it developed and what it should continue to be: a making of the people, at 
least in the widest sense. This is why customary international law is of such 
great importance. So to speak, the right of the defence of superior orders to exist 
is based on the custom of the defence. People feel that they are not guilty of a 
conduct because they were ordered to do so. This negates the mens rea as well , 
but it focuses more on the objective situation of the accused. If in case of a 
mistake of law there is no evil mind, in case of superior orders there is no mind 
at all. The superior-subordinate relationship is special , which is reflected in the 
defence. In my opinion, it is generally very important that law responds to the 
" legal needs" of people. 
In the creating process, the inclusion of article 33 in the Rome Statute was 
highly controversial. Especially New Zealand, Germany and the United 
206 Ibid . 
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Kingdom argued against it.207 Their delegates took the view that subordinates 
can only be excused for following orders in cases that fall under the categories 
of duress or mistake of law. This is probably true. However, even if there is no 
strict legal need for the defence of superior orders, it still needs to be included in 
international criminal law. Firstly, it should exist for the reasons mentioned 
above and secondly, apart from being a defence to a situation common in times 
of war, it defines a person's obligation to not give up thinking and follow orders 
blindly, but to apply a minimum of thought and humanity. Article 33 of the 
Rome Statute is part of the military education. It makes both, superiors and 
subordinates think about a possible future situation. A prepared soldier will be 
much more confident about refusing to obey an order. These aspects justify the 
existence of the defence. 
VII JUSTIFICATION OR EXCUSE 
A question the Rome Statute does not answer is whether the defence of superior 
orders works as a justification or an excuse. A justified action is regarded 
lawful , whereas an excused action remains illegaI.208 In the first case the 
accused acted lawful , in the second case they acted unlawful but without guilt. 
The nature of the defence becomes important in the context of complicity.209 
One cannot be an accomplice to or aid and abet a crime when the action was 
lawful , because then no crime exists.210 However, an excuse leaves the conduct 
unlawful and only affects the culpability of the accused alone.2 11 In that case the 
accomplice to the crime would still be punishable . 
207 Johan D van der Vyveer "The International Criminal Court and the Concept of Mens Rea in 
International Criminal Law" (2004) 12 U Miami lnt'I & Comp L Rev 57, 79. 
208 Takemura, above n 4, 160. 
209 Ibid . 
21° Cassese, above n 63, 952 . 
2 11 Takemura, above n 4, 161 . 
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Sliedregt writes that the defence of superior orders has to be an excuse because 
otherwise an inconsistency would occur.212 Justifying an unlawful order would 
make the conduct lawful. In her opinion, an act "cannot be illegal in ordering 
and legal in execution."213 
In my opinion, the defence of superior orders has to be qua! ified as an excuse 
because it refers to a very specific situation of the accused. The conduct is 
illegal but considering the circumstances the perpetrator is not culpable. 
Especially considering the sort of crimes the Rome Statute deals with, a strict 
interpretation of the law is necessary. The defence of superior orders can only 
be raised for the commission of war crimes and even the non-manifestly illegal 
war crimes cannot be qualified as lawful under any circumstances. That would 
not be acceptable. Therefore, the defence must work as an excuse. 
VIII CONCLUSION 
This essay showed that the debate about how to deal with the defence of 
superior orders is over hundreds of years old. Surprisingly, courts in the Middle 
Ages provided a very modern view on the issue, the concept of manifest 
illegality (although argued a little bit differently). Historically, many different 
and extreme points of view can be found that are all based on various 
philosophical ideas. The reason why this topic is so heavily argued till today, is 
that it goes to the core question : What is law? Many aspects influence the 
answer to this question and it is hard to reach a consensus. This paper only 
mentioned those relating to superior orders. 
In my opinion, the wording of article 33 is not clear enough. The term unlawful 
means that the order has to contradict law. This could mean that as long as the 
2 12 Sliedregt, above n 39, 335. 
213 [bid. 
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domestic law allows the atrocity, the conduct 1s not criminal. This 1s not 
consistent with the true meaning of the article. 
With article 33 the creators of the Rome Statute made a statement. They 
codified a doctrine in international criminal law that had only been applied to 
national trials for many years. For too long, on conferences, delegations from 
several countries had been strictly against this defence in international criminal 
law while applying it happily at home to their own people. Finally, this double 
standard has been eliminated. The defence of superior orders is now available to 
accused before the ICC. The fact that it has been exercised in domestic law 
refutes the assumption that the absolute liability approach is opinio Juris, and as 
a consequence, the Rome Statute contrary to customary international law. Those 
who criticise the non-inclusion of war crimes in paragraph 2 of article 33 have a 
point, because it is imprecise. Some war crimes are as manifestly illegal as 
crimes against humanity. Still, paragraph 2 does not deny war crimes the status 
of manifest unlawfulness, it only provides guidance for the recognition of the 
threshold. I agree with the idea that one cannot be allowed to not recognise 
genocide and crimes against humanity as what they are - the most serious 
crimes against the core of justice and nature. That war crimes are not manifestly 
unlawful per se seems logical, as not all war crimes are as abhorrent and 
therefore not as evidently criminal. Paragraph 2 is no exhaustive catalogue of 
the manifest illegal crimes. Aggression, though manifestly unlawful , cannot be 
object to the defence of superior orders. This has nothing to do with the degree 
of the unlawfulness of the crime, but relates to the fact that it cannot be ordered. 
Aggression is more an abstract decision and less an act. 
The scope of application for the defence is rather limited . For child soldiers it 
might be too limited. It is desirable that the creators of the Rome Statute give 
that problem some thought. The legal practice of the ICC will show if there is 
any room left for application of the defence at all. There are other defences that 
might take over. Yet, I consider article 33 a valuable part of the Rome Statute. It 
gives clear instructions on how to deal with a situation that according to the 
47 
frequency of it being raised, is common in times of war or rebellion. It prepares 
superiors and subordinates in an important way. 
It could be said that low rank soldiers are not well placed to prevent atrocities21 4, 
however, there is a nice saying from Carl Sandburg "Sometime they'll give a 
war and nobody will come."215 To imagine that people just refuse to participate 
in war or other crimes is a sweet utopia, but that is what law does. It creates 
rules which - if followed - create a peaceful, functioning society. Overall, 
regarding the defence of superior orders, the Rome Statute has set out a rule 
which protects those who have an innocent mind, but otherwise signalises: If 
someone orders war: Just don't go. 
214 
Martha Minow "Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for Abusive Conduct and 
the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence" (2007) 52 McGill LJ I, 35. 215 Carl Sandburg The People, Yes (Harcourt, Brace & Co, Michigan, 1936) 43. 
48 
Bibliography 
A International Treaties and Documents 
• Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra 
Leone on the Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone ( 4 
October 2000) Annex to UN Doc S/2000/915 
• Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East ( 19 
January 1946) 
• Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment, GA res. 39/46, annex, 39 UN GAOR Supp 
(No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1984) 
• International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (23 March 1976) 
UN Doc A/63 16 ( 1966) 
• International Criminal Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Genocide and Other Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of Rwanda and Rwandan 
Citizens Responsible for Genocide and Other Such Violations 
Committed in the Territory of Neighbouring States between 1 January 
and 31 December 1994 (8 November 1994) Annex to UN Doc 
S/RES/955 
• Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998) UN 
Doc A/CONF 183/9* 
• Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons 
Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law 
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991 (25 
May 1993) UN Doc S/25704 
• United Nations GA Res 3314 (XXIX) (14 December 1974) 
B Cases 
• Axtell 's Case (1660) 84 ER I 060 
• BGHSt 39, I - English version avai lable at 
http ://www.iuscomp.org/gla/judgments/bgh/s92 I l 03.htm (accessed 20 
February 2010) 
• BGHSt 39, 168 
• BGHSt 41, 101 
• BYerfGE 95, 96 
• Chief Military Prosecutor v. Melinki Appeal 279-283/58, 44 Psakim 
(Judgments of the District Courts oflsrael) 
• Cook 's Case (l 660) St Tr 1077 
• Dawkes v Lord Rokeby 176 Eng Rep 800 ( 1866) 
• Judgment in the Case of Lieutenants Dithmar and Boldt: Hospital Ship 
'Llandovery Castle' ( 1922) 16 AJIL 708 
• Keighley v Bell 176 Eng Rep 781 (1866) 
• Prosecutor v Akayesu Case No ICTR-96-4-T (Chamber 1, Trial 
Judgment) (2 September 1998) 
• Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-A (7 October 1997) 
(Sentencing Appeal, ICTY Appeal Chamber) avai lable at www.icty.org 
(accessed I December 2009) 
• Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-T (29 November 1996) 
(Sentencing Judgement, ICTY Trial Chamber I) avai lable at 
www.icty.org (accessed 1 December 2009) 
• Prosecutor v Erdemovic Case No. IT-96-22-Tbis (5 March 1998) 
(Sentencing Judgement, ICTY Trial Chamber I) available at 
www.icty.org (accessed 1 December 2009) 
• R v Fin ta 1994 CarswellOnt 61 (Supreme Court of Canada) 
• R v James 173 ER 429 
• R v Trainer 176 ER 488 
• US v Calley (1973) 22 USCMA 534 
II 
• US v Huet-Vaughn (28 December 1995) 43 MJ 105 
C Legislation 
• Austrian Criminal Code 
• French Criminal Code 
• German Democratic Republic Penal Code: StGB-DDR, text in German 
available at www.verfassungen.de/de/ddr/strafgesetzbuch74 (accessed 
20 February 2010) 
• German Penal Code - translation www.iuscomp.org (accessed I 0 
February 20 I 0) 
• New Zealand Crimes Act 1961 
C Books 
• Andreas Zimmermann "Superior Orders" in The Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court: A Commentary Volume I Antonio 
Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R W D Jones (ed) (Oxford University Press, 
New York, 2002) 
• Aristotle N;comachean Eth;cs 
• Carl Sandburg The People, Yes (Harcourt, Brace & Co, Michigan, 
1936) 
• David Dyzenhaus, Arthur Ripstein, Sophia Reibetanz Moreau (ed) Law 
and Morality: Read;ngs in Legal Phdosophy (3 rd ed, University of 
Toronto Press, Toronto, 2007) 
• Elies van Sliedregt The Criminal Responsibility of Individuals for 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (TMC Asser Press, The 
Hague, Netherlands, 2003) 
• Eugene Davidson The Trial of the Germans: an account of the twenty-
two defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 
(University of Missouri Press, Columbia, 1997) 
Ill 
• Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Olivia Swaak-Goldman Substantive and 
procedural aspects of international criminal law: the experience of 
international and national courts Volume 2 Part 2 (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 2000) 
• Gustav Radbruch "Gesetzliches Unrecht und Ubergesetzliches Recht" 
(1946) in Rechtsphilosophie (5th ed, Koehler Verlag, 1956) 
• Hitomi Takemura International Human Right to Conscientious 
Objection to Military Service and Individual Duties to Disobey 
Manifestly !lLegal Orders (Springer Berlin Heidelberg 2009) 
• Lassa Oppenheim InternaUona/ Law, A Treatise Vol II (Longmans, 
Green,London, 1906) 
• Mark Tebbit Philosophy of Law - An Introduction (2nd ed, Routledge, 
Abingdon, 2005) 
• Nico Keijzer Military Obedience (Sijthoff & Noordhoff, Alphen aan den 
Rijn, Netherlands, 1978 
• Otto Triffterer Commentary on the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court: Observers' Notes, Article by Article (Beck, Mtinchen, 
2008) 
• Raymond Wacks Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, New 
York, 2006) 
• Susan Lamb "Hullum Crimen, Nully Poena Sine Lege In International 
Criminal Law" in The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court: 
A Commentary Volume I Antonio Cassese, Paola Gaeta, John R W D 
Jones ( ed) (Oxford University Press, New York, 2002) 
• Yolanda Huet-Vaughn "Statement Refusing to Serve in the 1991 Gulf 
War" (9 January 1991) printed in Howard Zinn, Anthony Arnove (ed) 
Voices of a People's History in the United States (Seven Stories Press, 
New York, 2004) 
IV 
D Articles 
• Andrew Bowers "A Concession to Humanity in the Killing of Innocents 
- Validating the Defences of Duress and Superior Orders in International 
Law" (2003) 15 Windsor Rev Legal & Soc Issues 31 
• Arne Willy Dahl "Command Responsibility and the Defence of Superior 
Orders" www.uio.no (accessed 29 November 2009) 
• Benjamin B Ferencz "Ending Impunity for the Crime of Aggression" 
(2009) 41 Case W Res J Int'I L 281 
• Boleslaw A Boczek International Law: A Dictionary (Scarecrow Press, 
Lanham, 2005) 
• David Dyzenhaus "The Dilemma of Legality" in The Limits of Law 
Autin Sarat, Laurence Douglas, Martha Merill Umpfrey (ed) (Stanford 
University Press, Standford, 2005) 
• Dr Mohammed Saif-Alden Wattad "The Rome Statute and Captain 
Planet: What lies between ' Crimes Against Humanity ' and the 'Natural 
Environment ' ?" (2009) 19 Fordham Envtl L Rev 265 
• Edoardo Greppi "The evolution of individual criminal responsibility 
under international law" www.icrc.ch (accessed 20 November 2009) 
• Gary D Solis "Obedience to Orders" (2004) 2 J Int ' I Crim Just 988 
• Giovannangelo De Francesco "Radbruch Formula and Criminal Law" 
(2003) 1 J Int'I Crim Just 728 
• Henry Mather "Natural Law and Liberalism" (2000 - 2001) 52 SC L 
Rev 331 
• Hilaire McCoubrey ,,From Nuremberg to Rome: Restoring the Defence 
of Superior Orders" (2000) 50 Int ' I & Comp LQ 3 86 
• Hong S Wills "Cumulative Convictions and the Double Jeopardy Rule : 
Pursuing Justice at the ICTY and the JCTR" (2003) 17 Emory Int'I L 
Rev 341 
V 
• Howard S Levie "The Rise and Fall of an Internationally Codified 
Denial of the Defense of Superior Orders" ( 1998) 70 Int'I L Stud Ser US 
Naval WarCol 169 
• James B Insco "Defense Of Superior Orders Before Military 
Commissions" (2003) 13 Duke J Comp & lnt ' I L 389 
• Jan-Geert Alexander Knoops Defenses in Contemporary International 
Criminal Law (2nd ed, Martin us Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2008) 
• Johan D van der Vyveer "The International Criminal Court and the 
Concept of Mens Rea in International Criminal Law" (2004) 12 U 
Miami Int'l & Comp L Rev 57 
• K K Mathew "Right to Rebellion and Obedience to Superior Orders" in 
(l 983) Three Lectures 44 
• Kai Ambos "General Principles Of Criminal Law In The Rome Statute" 
( 1999) 10 Criminal Law Forum I 
• Kai Ambos "Toward a Universal System of Crime: Comments on 
George Fletcher's Grammar of Criminal Law" (2006-2007) 28 Cardozo 
L Rev 2647 
• Larry May "Aggression, Humanitarian Intervention , and Terrorism" 
(2009) 41 Case W Res J Int'I L 32 I 
• Leslie C Green "Fifteenth Waldemar A Solf Lecture in International 
Law - Superior Orders and Command Responsibility" (2003) 175 Mil L 
Rev 309 
• Leslie C Green "Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man" (1970) 8 Can 
YB Int'I L61 
• Mark A Drumbl "The Push to Criminalize Aggression: Something Lost 
Amid the Gains" (2009) 41 Case W Res J Int'I L 291 
• Martha Minow ·'Living Up to Rules: Holding Soldiers Responsible for 
Abusive Conduct and the Dilemma of the Superior Orders Defence" 
(2007) 52 McGill LJ I 
VI 
• Massimo Scaliotti "Defences before the Internatinoal Criminal Court : 
Substantive Grounds for Excluding Criminal Responsibility - Part I" 
(200 I) I Int'I Crim L Rev 111 
• Matthew R Lippman "Humanitarian Law: The Development and Scope 
of the Superior Orders Defense" (200 I - 2002) 20 Penn St Int ' I L Rev 
153 
• Max Salomon She liens "Aristotle on Natural Law" ( 1959) 4 Nat LF 72 
• Micah Goodman "After the Wall : Legal Ramifications of the East 
German Border Guard Trials in Unified Germany" ( 1996) 29 Cornell 
Int ' l LJ 727 
• Mitchell Franklin "Sources Of International Law Relating To Sanctions 
Against War Criminals" (I 945 - 1946) 36 J Crim L & Criminology 153 
• Neil Boothby " What happens when child soldiers grow up? The 
Mozambique case study" Intervention 2006, Volume 4, Number 3, 244 
• Paola Gaeta "The Defence of Superior Order: The Statute of the 
International Criminal Court versus Customary International Law" 
(1999) 10 EIJL 172 
• Robert Aitkne, Marilyn Aitken "Pride and Prejudice: The Dark Side of 
Henry Ford" (2005-2006) 32 Litigation 53 
• Sergey Sayapin "A Great Unknown: The Definition of Aggression 
Revisited" (2008-2009) 17 Mich St J Int'I L 377 
• Stanley Yeo " Insanity Defense in the Criminal Laws of the 
Commonwealths of Nations" (2008) 2008 Sing J Legal Stud 241 
• Susan Bandes " 'We the People' and Our Enduring Values" (1997-1998) 
96 Mich L Rev 1376 (Crime and Punishment) 
• Susanne Walther "Problems in Blaming and Punishing Individuals For 
Human Rights Violations: The Example of the Berlin Wall Shootings" 
(1993) 1 Eur J Crime Crim L & Crim Just 104 
• Ziv Bohrer "Clear and Obvious - A Critical Examination of the Superior 
Order Defense in Israeli Case Law" (2005 - 2006) 2 IDF LR 197 
Vll 
E Texts 
• Discussion paper on the crime of aggression proposed by the Chairman 
(revision June 2008) (14 May 2008) ICC-ASP/6/SWGCA/2 
• The United Nations War Crimes Commission Law reports of trials of 
war aiminals (William S Hein & Co, Buffalo, New York, 1997) 
G Other Sources 
• "Baldur von Schirach" www.annefrank.dk (accessed 23 February 2010) 
• Deutsche Welle "More Than 1,100 Berlin Wall Victims" (9 August 
2005) www.dw-world.de (accessed 21 February 20 I 0) 
• Encyclopredia Britannica www.britannica.com 
• International Centre for Criminal Law Reform and Criminal Justice 
Policy International Criminal Court - Manual/or the Ratification and 
Implementation of the Rome Statute (3 rded, University of British 
Columbia, Vancouver, 2008) 
• Judicial Decisions Involving Questions of International Law--
International Military Tribunal (Nuremburg), Judgment and Sentences 
(194 7) 41 Am J lnt'l L I 17 
• Oxford University Press www.oup.com "order" (accessed 29 December 
2009) 
• Qur'an 
• The Bible 
• The Nobelprize "The Nobel Peace Prize 1993" www.nobelprize .org 
(accessed 24 February 20 I 0) 
VIII 

VICTORIA UNIVERSllY Of WELLINGTON LIBRARY 
11 11111 111111 11 1111 1111111111111 1111111 11111111111111 111111111 11111 11 111 11111 111 
3 7212 01597840 4 
